By this logic, because all humans are partially consequentialist, and in general are messy and make mistakes, no humans can credibly precommit to anything. And in a comparative sense, a human-who-claims-to-be-a-consequentialist can precommit to anything just as much as a human-who-claims-to-be-a-deontologist (note that 99% of humans claim to be neither, and do not care at all about those distinctions, yet manage to organize fine), and this is what we see in practice - large EA orgs, and large orgaizations of claimed utilitarians, seem to organize better than comparison orgs of normies in charity or philosophy.
No. Humans are fallible and inconsistent irrespective of this logic, but that's a separate issue. By this logic, precommitment to utilitarian moral calculus plus consequentialist decision theory is definitionally incompatible with credible promise of context-agnostic rule observance, regardless of generic fallibility in practice; a perfectly rational and consistent Singerian reasoner would not be perfectly trustworthy, whereas a perfect Kantian would be. And in fact a perfect Singerian would be much less trustworthy than the normal issue, because he'd see more loopholes and opportunities to rob Peter for helping n>1 Pauls without second-order complications, and would consistently opt to pounce on them. In practice, all humans, even Singer I guess, are partially deontological too, and have moral compunctions that rely on things like habits and naive empathy, not to mention the fear of getting caught.
I believe that the difference between doctrines in theory indicates the direction one would practically skew in.
And in a comparative sense, a human-who-claims-to-be-a-consequentialist can precommit to anything just as much as a human-who-claims-to-be-a-deontologist
...Yes, people can deceive.
large EA orgs, and large orgaizations of claimed utilitarians, seem to organize better than comparison orgs of normies in charity or philosophy
I am not at all sure if EAs organize better in some measurable sense than old school charities. They're very likely better at minmaxing specific interventions, and have had a growth spurt lately. But e.g. The Giving Pledge seems like a much bigger deal. And anyway, Eigenrobot and Hanson argue that Charity is not about Helping, so it may be that old charities have been organizing very well, for their purposes.
This website is a place for people who want to move past shady thinking and test their ideas in a
court of people who don't all share the same biases. Our goal is to
optimize for light, not heat; this is a group effort, and all commentators are asked to do their part.
The weekly Culture War threads host the most
controversial topics and are the most visible aspect of The Motte. However, many other topics are
appropriate here. We encourage people to post anything related to science, politics, or philosophy;
if in doubt, post!
Check out The Vault for an archive of old quality posts.
You are encouraged to crosspost these elsewhere.
Why are you called The Motte?
A motte is a stone keep on a raised earthwork common in early medieval fortifications. More pertinently,
it's an element in a rhetorical move called a "Motte-and-Bailey",
originally identified by
philosopher Nicholas Shackel. It describes the tendency in discourse for people to move from a controversial
but high value claim to a defensible but less exciting one upon any resistance to the former. He likens
this to the medieval fortification, where a desirable land (the bailey) is abandoned when in danger for
the more easily defended motte. In Shackel's words, "The Motte represents the defensible but undesired
propositions to which one retreats when hard pressed."
On The Motte, always attempt to remain inside your defensible territory, even if you are not being pressed.
New post guidelines
If you're posting something that isn't related to the culture war, we encourage you to post a thread for it.
A submission statement is highly appreciated, but isn't necessary for text posts or links to largely-text posts
such as blogs or news articles; if we're unsure of the value of your post, we might remove it until you add a
submission statement. A submission statement is required for non-text sources (videos, podcasts, images).
Culture war posts go in the culture war thread; all links must either include a submission statement or
significant commentary. Bare links without those will be removed.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
By this logic, because all humans are partially consequentialist, and in general are messy and make mistakes, no humans can credibly precommit to anything. And in a comparative sense, a human-who-claims-to-be-a-consequentialist can precommit to anything just as much as a human-who-claims-to-be-a-deontologist (note that 99% of humans claim to be neither, and do not care at all about those distinctions, yet manage to organize fine), and this is what we see in practice - large EA orgs, and large orgaizations of claimed utilitarians, seem to organize better than comparison orgs of normies in charity or philosophy.
No. Humans are fallible and inconsistent irrespective of this logic, but that's a separate issue. By this logic, precommitment to utilitarian moral calculus plus consequentialist decision theory is definitionally incompatible with credible promise of context-agnostic rule observance, regardless of generic fallibility in practice; a perfectly rational and consistent Singerian reasoner would not be perfectly trustworthy, whereas a perfect Kantian would be. And in fact a perfect Singerian would be much less trustworthy than the normal issue, because he'd see more loopholes and opportunities to rob Peter for helping n>1 Pauls without second-order complications, and would consistently opt to pounce on them. In practice, all humans, even Singer I guess, are partially deontological too, and have moral compunctions that rely on things like habits and naive empathy, not to mention the fear of getting caught.
I believe that the difference between doctrines in theory indicates the direction one would practically skew in.
...Yes, people can deceive.
I am not at all sure if EAs organize better in some measurable sense than old school charities. They're very likely better at minmaxing specific interventions, and have had a growth spurt lately. But e.g. The Giving Pledge seems like a much bigger deal. And anyway, Eigenrobot and Hanson argue that Charity is not about Helping, so it may be that old charities have been organizing very well, for their purposes.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link