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Does my Philosophy of Sexuality Professor Have a Point? (It's a mandatory gen-ed)

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Premise one is a big problem, and accepting it is where you went wrong. A couple of arguments you might put out there:

A) An obligation not to racially select friends is self-defeating. Anti-black racist Howard goes to school with Jamaal, a black guy. "Jamaal isn't a potential friend - too black," thinks Howard. Normally, he never reconsiders after ruling out potential friends. But remembering his obligation, he puts Howard back into the 'potential friend' camp, and they eventually become friends. The reason Howard and Jamaal are friends is only because of Jamaal's race. Had Jamaal been of any other race, being written off as a potential friend would be the end of it. The obligation not to racially select friends forced him to racially select a friend. There are two ways to object to this, both of which undermine the argument about partners.

a) Potential friends aren't friends, and the obligation is not to select friends by race: Then the same goes for sex, and ruling out potential partners isn't problematic.

b) It's really an obligation not to have preferences of this kind: Accepting that Premise 1 and Premise 2 are analogous, Ought implies can; people can't avoid having sexual preferences, and sexual preferences aren't something people can voluntarily change. Thus, people can't be obligated not to have or to change their sexual preferences.

Another avenue to attack the argument is to deny that premise 2 is analogous to premise 1.

B) Granting Premise 1 for the sake of debate, premise two is not analogous. While obligation may come into the formation of friendships, no person is obligated to consent to sex with somebody else, for any reason. Therefore, the obligations described in premise two are false. Worse, they're harmful, legitimizing traditions of marital rape and homophobia wherein the sexual autonomy and dignity of women and LGBT persons are trampled in the name of moral obligation. That "No means no" outweighs any argument about the legitimacy of the refuser's preferences.