From my (gen-ed required) Philosophy of Sexuality class:
Premise 1: We are obligated not to racially select our friends, even if this is motivated by a preference for a certain race of friends.
Premise 2: If we are obligated not to racially select our friends, we're obligated not to racially select our romantic and sexual partners.
Conclusion A: Therefore, we're obligated not to racially select our romantic and sexual partners.
Premise 3: If we're obligated not to racially select our friends, romantic, or sexual partners, this is because race is an immutable characteristic. So, we're also obligated not to select our partners based on any other immutable characteristics. (Modified version: swap "immutable" with "non-desert based") (Modification 2: With one qualification: except in cases where doing so comes at an unreasonably extreme cost to oneself.)*
Conclusion B: Therefore, we must be all-inclusive with respect to immutable characteristics in friendship and dating.
So the implication is that we all have an obligation to become bisexual. Why? Because no one would accept "I just don't desire them as such" as a justification for why one systematically doesn't befriend black people. I'm suspicious of this argument, but I can't identify a knock-down flaw. So maybe I should just accept it? I don't want to, but if I'm being honest I can't find "the problem" yet.
Objection to Premise 3: There's cases where it's wrong to discriminate that aren't based on immutable characteristics (hair color, for example). This implies that the best explanation of what makes discrimination wrong is that it fails to track desert instead. But then, no one deserves to have ASD, and yet I don't think people would agree I am compelled to select friends from a subset of people who are violent and nonverbal due to severe ASD. Maybe this could be dealt with by modifying premise 3 to include a "reasonable burdensomeness qualification": your habits of selective association should track desert unless doing so comes at an unreasonably harsh cost to yourself. So if the boredom of befriending a nonverbal person is too intense, or if their violence is too much for you, you would be excused from the general obligation described by premise 3, but that wouldn't permit racism or ableism in general.
But now I'm puzzled, because A) I feel like I have a moral obligation not to racially discriminate in friendship, but B) I don't feel like I have an obligation not to choose not to befriend a tennis player just because I don't have the necessary desires, even though tennis players don't deserve friendship any less than black people.
Objection to Premise 2: I think romantic/sexual attraction to someone is a lot more immutable than who you're friends with, but to the extent that you can change your preferences without assuming an unreasonably harsh burden, or act despite your desires, shouldn't you? Imagine if you had a mild disgust reaction every time you thought about black people, and for that reason you decided never to befriend black people. Wouldn't it be incumbent on you to repress or replace that disgust reaction if doing so was within your power? How disgusting would black people have to be to you before it was no longer morally necessary for you to suck it up and act inclusively despite it? For whatever reason society has an unspoken agreement that racial dating preferences are okay, especially if it's within race. But maybe there's some independent reason why it's okay in certain contexts, despite being wrong in general?
*The defense of premise 3 is:
A) Since Premise 1 (it's wrong to racially select our friends) is an uncontroversial judgement, an explanation is called for.
B) The best explanation is going to be something that identifies a feature all cases of racial discrimination have in common.
C) Immutable characteristics is the feature my professor thinks most promising.
I objected to this because it seems like someone who thinks racially selecting their friends is wrong also wants to say selecting based on hairstyles or hair color is wrong, even though that could be changed.
But then, my prof replied by saying "in that case, what all the cases have in common is that discrimination is happening without a desert-based justification."
So, she proposes a modified version of premise 3: "If we're obligated not to racially select our friends, romantic, or sexual partners, this is because race is not a desert-relevant characteristic. So, we're also obligated not to select our partners based on any other desert-relevant characteristics."
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Notes -
Premise one is a big problem, and accepting it is where you went wrong. A couple of arguments you might put out there:
A) An obligation not to racially select friends is self-defeating. Anti-black racist Howard goes to school with Jamaal, a black guy. "Jamaal isn't a potential friend - too black," thinks Howard. Normally, he never reconsiders after ruling out potential friends. But remembering his obligation, he puts Howard back into the 'potential friend' camp, and they eventually become friends. The reason Howard and Jamaal are friends is only because of Jamaal's race. Had Jamaal been of any other race, being written off as a potential friend would be the end of it. The obligation not to racially select friends forced him to racially select a friend. There are two ways to object to this, both of which undermine the argument about partners.
a) Potential friends aren't friends, and the obligation is not to select friends by race: Then the same goes for sex, and ruling out potential partners isn't problematic.
b) It's really an obligation not to have preferences of this kind: Accepting that Premise 1 and Premise 2 are analogous, Ought implies can; people can't avoid having sexual preferences, and sexual preferences aren't something people can voluntarily change. Thus, people can't be obligated not to have or to change their sexual preferences.
Another avenue to attack the argument is to deny that premise 2 is analogous to premise 1.
B) Granting Premise 1 for the sake of debate, premise two is not analogous. While obligation may come into the formation of friendships, no person is obligated to consent to sex with somebody else, for any reason. Therefore, the obligations described in premise two are false. Worse, they're harmful, legitimizing traditions of marital rape and homophobia wherein the sexual autonomy and dignity of women and LGBT persons are trampled in the name of moral obligation. That "No means no" outweighs any argument about the legitimacy of the refuser's preferences.
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