orthoxerox
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2yr ago
Russia for reasons not yet clear, did not match this escalation and marshal the resources necessary to counter it in a timely fashion.
To quote a decade-old video game:
The answer is really quite simple. Incompetence. Incompetence at the highest echelons of power. We put our trust, our faith, in halfwits. Our intrepid leaders had everything they wanted. Power. Wealth. Prestige. And it made them lazy, America. Oh yes. And laziness breeds stupidity.
It's hard to point at something Russia did well in this war. The fifth columnists in Kherson were a good stratagem, but they were supposed to surrender multiple border regions. But everything else was badly mismanaged. And making mistakes is not the worst thing one can do, not learning from them is. Russian military has a disgustingly long feedback cycle.
Now Russia has to deal with multiple long-term trends:
its military is learning to wage war (+ve)
its military is losing matériel (-ve)
its economy is being drained by sanctions (-ve)
Reversing the two negative trends is impossible right now, the degradation can at most be slowed down. From my perspective, the total sum of these three trends is negative, that's why I expect the mobilization to continue: flooding the frontline with mobiks will make Izyum-style breakthroughs much harder to execute, while professional forces will be able to pull back, R&R and redeploy for another strike while there's enough matériel to strike with.
For Ukraine the situation is different:
its economy is on life support
its military supply is on life support
its military is losing manpower (-ve)
its military is getting better training and better weapons (+ve)
The collapse of their economy will be postponed until the war is over, so it's easier to view Ukraine as an army with an unusually large group of camp followers. And for the sum of their long-term military trends, I think they can be viewed as broadly neutral.
This means Ukraine has two goals:
prevent Russia from utilizing their remaining short-term advantage (NATO intelligence is a great help)
accelerate Russian negative trends by lobbying for more sanctions and more precision munitions
Their economy will crash either way, but if it happens in 2024 it won't be as bad as if it does in 2026. Their job is to not lose.
Their economy will crash either way, but if it happens in 2024 it won't be as bad as if it does in 2026. Their job is to not lose.
Indeed, the way I see it Ukraine today is in a similar boat to Finland in the 1940s, thier goals are simple. A) Survive. B) Inflict sufficient casualties on Russia to deter future incursions. Everything else is gravy.
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Notes -
To quote a decade-old video game:
It's hard to point at something Russia did well in this war. The fifth columnists in Kherson were a good stratagem, but they were supposed to surrender multiple border regions. But everything else was badly mismanaged. And making mistakes is not the worst thing one can do, not learning from them is. Russian military has a disgustingly long feedback cycle.
Now Russia has to deal with multiple long-term trends:
its military is learning to wage war (+ve)
its military is losing matériel (-ve)
its economy is being drained by sanctions (-ve)
Reversing the two negative trends is impossible right now, the degradation can at most be slowed down. From my perspective, the total sum of these three trends is negative, that's why I expect the mobilization to continue: flooding the frontline with mobiks will make Izyum-style breakthroughs much harder to execute, while professional forces will be able to pull back, R&R and redeploy for another strike while there's enough matériel to strike with.
For Ukraine the situation is different:
its economy is on life support
its military supply is on life support
its military is losing manpower (-ve)
its military is getting better training and better weapons (+ve)
The collapse of their economy will be postponed until the war is over, so it's easier to view Ukraine as an army with an unusually large group of camp followers. And for the sum of their long-term military trends, I think they can be viewed as broadly neutral.
This means Ukraine has two goals:
prevent Russia from utilizing their remaining short-term advantage (NATO intelligence is a great help)
accelerate Russian negative trends by lobbying for more sanctions and more precision munitions
Their economy will crash either way, but if it happens in 2024 it won't be as bad as if it does in 2026. Their job is to not lose.
Indeed, the way I see it Ukraine today is in a similar boat to Finland in the 1940s, thier goals are simple. A) Survive. B) Inflict sufficient casualties on Russia to deter future incursions. Everything else is gravy.
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