This weekly roundup thread is intended for all culture war posts. 'Culture war' is vaguely defined, but it basically means controversial issues that fall along set tribal lines. Arguments over culture war issues generate a lot of heat and little light, and few deeply entrenched people ever change their minds. This thread is for voicing opinions and analyzing the state of the discussion while trying to optimize for light over heat.
Optimistically, we think that engaging with people you disagree with is worth your time, and so is being nice! Pessimistically, there are many dynamics that can lead discussions on Culture War topics to become unproductive. There's a human tendency to divide along tribal lines, praising your ingroup and vilifying your outgroup - and if you think you find it easy to criticize your ingroup, then it may be that your outgroup is not who you think it is. Extremists with opposing positions can feed off each other, highlighting each other's worst points to justify their own angry rhetoric, which becomes in turn a new example of bad behavior for the other side to highlight.
We would like to avoid these negative dynamics. Accordingly, we ask that you do not use this thread for waging the Culture War. Examples of waging the Culture War:
-
Shaming.
-
Attempting to 'build consensus' or enforce ideological conformity.
-
Making sweeping generalizations to vilify a group you dislike.
-
Recruiting for a cause.
-
Posting links that could be summarized as 'Boo outgroup!' Basically, if your content is 'Can you believe what Those People did this week?' then you should either refrain from posting, or do some very patient work to contextualize and/or steel-man the relevant viewpoint.
In general, you should argue to understand, not to win. This thread is not territory to be claimed by one group or another; indeed, the aim is to have many different viewpoints represented here. Thus, we also ask that you follow some guidelines:
-
Speak plainly. Avoid sarcasm and mockery. When disagreeing with someone, state your objections explicitly.
-
Be as precise and charitable as you can. Don't paraphrase unflatteringly.
-
Don't imply that someone said something they did not say, even if you think it follows from what they said.
-
Write like everyone is reading and you want them to be included in the discussion.
On an ad hoc basis, the mods will try to compile a list of the best posts/comments from the previous week, posted in Quality Contribution threads and archived at /r/TheThread. You may nominate a comment for this list by clicking on 'report' at the bottom of the post and typing 'Actually a quality contribution' as the report reason.
Jump in the discussion.
No email address required.
Notes -
This might be a good lesson if Putin did this. Did he? You don't cite any evidence of this in your post.
What exactly, did Putin say? Here, on a quick Google, according to Newsweek:
So (at least here) he actually did not threaten nuclear war in the event of ATACMS strikes. He reminded everyone of Russia's nuclear doctrine. Which – newsflash! – is the same as or arguably more restrictive than US nuclear doctrine in this regard (the United States, unlike some nations, does not have preconditions on nuclear use.)
Now, I'm not saying it's not saber-rattling when Putin comes out and reminds everyone of Russia's nuclear doctrine every few months. But Ukrainian ATACMS strikes are very unlikely to pose a critical threat to the sovereignty of Russia. And while people insist on interpreting this as an aggressive deterrent, it's also worth noting that if you read it literally Putin is telling the United States that if they let Ukraine use a few ATACMS inside of Russia
You could see a contrarian newspaper reporting this as "Putin indicates limited ATACMS strikes inside Russia will not draw nuclear response." People always assume the point of these sorts of communications is to threaten, which isn't untrue, but it is also to communicate what is and isn't likely to trigger a genie you can't put back in the bottle, which is very important when two nuclear powers are fighting a proxy war.
Now, if Putin said something else that is actually a red-line, please feel free to comment so I can update my databanks. Otherwise, I think the nuclear portion of this won't be relevant until and unless Ukraine launches so enough ATACMS at critical Russian infrastructure to threaten the safety of the state.
And please, please understand that news stories saying stuff like "RUSSIA UPDATES NUCLEAR POLICIES TO INCLUDE A NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS" are substantively the same ones that have appeared for years every time Russia tweaks its nuclear doctrine (seriously, my second link here links to my third link!) because this is in fact a longstanding part of Russian nuclear doctrine, which has acknowledged that certain conventional attacks may warrant a nuclear response since 1992.
I agree with your conclusions, but disagree with your approach on 'what did they actually say' as a defense against Russian red liens threats. That's providing an overly strict definition of 'red lines' which assumes Russia actually provides clear coherent red lines and does so specifically via Putin, which isn't really how Russia operates.
Russia routinely provides a variety of framings / warnings / threats by different actors within the government. None of these have any actual binding power- Putin's own flip-flops/lies/whatevers have a long story, but the same applies across the foreign ministry, the military, and any other communication channel you like. None of these are absolutely authoritative, and any of these warnings may be ignored, or dismissed, or forgotten as useful.
What Russia does is more of retroactively justify an action based on some previous claim of a red line. There's always a 'our previous warning was ignored' warning to find, even as when Russia is making these warnings it uses them in a more aggressive-bounding function (in the sense of claiming more expansive red lines than one actually has, so that you can get more concessions without making a direct threat).
So when you say something like this-
-this is wrong, because reminding everyone of Russia's nuclear doctrine is how Russia regularly makes threats, because Russia's nuclear doctrine is deliberately vague enough to create space to justify a response. That Russia routinely does not carry through with those justifications is irrelevant to the claim that it's not a threat, because if Russia were to carry through, then Russia would point to something like-
-as the proof that it warned (i.e. threatened) beforehand.
In other words, it's a motte-and-bailey. It's a threat until it's challenged and retreats to the position of not being a threat, unless there's a counter-attack afterwards in which case it totally was a threat.
Well, perhaps the term I used ("saber-rattling") makes more sense in the context of Russia than the "red-line" term, which is traditionally how Americans frame their responses.
To the OP's point, though, I think it's fairly unlikely (but more on that below) that Russia will use nuclear weapons in response to ATACMS as the result of most foreseeable and probable events. And if they do, it's extremely unlikely that they use them against the United States. So - unless you disagree - Russia saying "hey if the United States gives Ukraine enough weapons to create a strategic threat to our state we will respond with nuclear force" probably isn't a statement that's being issued to provide "we warned you" cover, since it's unlikely that Russia responds with nuclear weapons except in the specific circumstances they mentioned, which are not likely to happen since it's unlikely the US provides support necessary for Ukraine to pull something of that magnitude off, perhaps due to all the saber-rattling by Russia. Unless you actually think Russia will pop a tactical over a few ATACMS - which would be an interesting argument, and I'd be very happy to hear it :)
I will say that I think Russia has some unusual ideas of what constitutes an existential threat. There's a story that they almost cracked open the silos over a Norwegian rocket launch in Yeltsin's time because they thought it could be a preface to a full-blown attack, and I've heard that the reason they are so concerned about the AEGIS Ashore sites in Romania is because they worry they could be used as a decapitation weapon (any antiballistic missile can technically be used as a ground attack missile...) So I can see a situation where they are preparing cover against a counter-attack because they think Ukraine will pull something like that, or they are afraid they will think Ukraine is pulling like that, and respond accordingly. Let's say hypothetically they use a nuclear cruise missile against a HIMARS they mistakenly(?) assess is being loaded with a WMD. In which case, I agree, the long string of "we told you so" would be helpful to them. But I kinda doubt they are planning to use a tactical nuke in the normal course of events and are laying a trail to justify that.
Personally, from where I sit right now, I think as long as the US is holding Ukraine's hands, they will keep aiming at random ammo dumps, the Russians will remind everyone of their nuclear doctrine periodically, and no nuclear weapons are likely be used (although I reserve the right to change my mind in the face of exciting new evidence!)
And I'd like to say again I agree with your conclusion on Russia nuclear weapon usage and saber rattling!
This was purely a dissent on how the Russian state communicates threats. :-)
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
Selling arms to a belligerent on normal commercial terms definitely doesn't breach neutrality under international law (although the arms shipments themselves are usually legitimate military targets). Nor does providing them on less-than-commercial terms (such as Lend-Lease in WW2, which was legally compatible with US neutrality). It isn't obvious why giving them away free would change the logic.
Russia has claimed that Ukrainians are unable to use western weapons without a level of in-theatre technical support which would make the supplier a co-belligerent, but I don't believe them.
My understanding of neutrality law is so-so, but as I understand it, you're very much incorrect here, at least as far as traditional understandings of neutrality goes.
My understanding is that it does not breach neutrality norms if they are being sold under equal terms to both sides. Which obviously is not happening here.
It may have been legally compatible with US neutrality law, but that does not mean that it was not a breach of traditional norms surrounding neutrality - it was very obvious to everyone that the US was not a neutral party, and that it was aiding Britain against Germany.
This is a pretty clear breach of traditional neutrality. If you are aiding one party militarily, you aren't neutral (although that doesn't necessarily qualify as an act of war, as I understand it, but it might be considered a cause for war.) There was a huge fracas during the American Civil War when the Americans accused the British of breaching neutrality by building warships for the Confederacy.
Well, as per US reporting, it appears that the Russians were at least partially correct about this, and the Pentagon is now soliciting bids for contractors to provide technical support in-theater.
(There's also the interesting question of how you define "in-theater"? The Russians are supposedly providing satellite intelligence to the Houthis to attack US shipping, is that a neutral act? Is it not an act of war, or, at a minimum, a valid cause for war? But of course the United States has been providing similar intelligence support to the Ukrainians since the beginning of the war, as has been acknowledged.)
The US was, uncontroversially, legally neutral under international law during the Lend-Lease period - that's why Germany had to declare war after Pearl Harbour - everyone understood that they were not already at war.
This mattered - before Pearl Harbour, U-boats did not operate in US waters. After Pearl Harbour and the declaration of war, they did - the period between Pearl Harbour and the US putting effective anti-submarine defences in place is called the Second Happy Time (happy, that is, for U-boat captains) by military historians.
There is a big difference between an unfriendly country and a country you are actually at war with. There are times when this matters - in the case of the US vs the Soviet Union, it is why we are still alive.
I think you're a bit mistaken about how neutrality works. As I mentioned above, a state of non-neutrality is not the same thing as a state of war. I recommend this CRS report – relevant excerpt:
[...]
So, yes, US war aid to England did violate neutrality. It did not (by itself) constitute an act of war.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
It's certainly true that without the level of intelligence provided by the US (down to specific GPS data) these weapons would not be anywhere near as useful.
In a sense it's a bit silly to argue about whether the Ukies are setting up the target package themselves or letting a US soldier do it before they press the button. Most of the work is probably being done by the DIA here.
I think there is a meaningful difference between this and the F-16s. Whether that raises to cobelligerance is an open question though.
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link
More options
Context Copy link