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Notes -
In another interesting development in a week with a number of interesting developments, the Syrian civil war has kicked back up a bit with a surprise rebel offensive that has taken Aleppo, one of Syria's largest cities last meaningfully contested in 2016. What has been almost as surprising as the offensive itself has been the speed and success of the advance.
The Syrian Civil War has more or less been frozen for the last few years, but with Assad only controlling around 70% of the country. However, the freeze not only included the American-backed counter-ISIS presence in the far east, but the Turkish-backed anti-Assad elements in the far north. The later Turkish-backed elements are what have made the recent offensive.
What starts to introduce some intrigue is the timing / possible reasoning for the timing. Specifically, the recent (still tentative) ceasefire close to of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, which depending on whose reported numbers you believe killed and/or wounded thousands of Hezbollah members, including much of Hezbollah's senior leaders.
This matters because those senior leaders and forces were key deciders in Hezbollah's support for Assad in the Syrian Civil War. In 2017 a hezbollah commander claimed to have 10,000 Hezbollah fighters in Syria, and while that number was almost certainly theatrical propaganda it does illustrate the point of a substantial Hezbollah presence and interest. This, in turn, was an extension of Hezbollah's role as an Iranian ally/proxy force, being used to supplement fellow Iranian ally Assad by providing desperately needed manpower. However, the recent Hezbollah-Israel conflict has been extremely disruptive, and Hezbollah is in a period of recovery / reorganization.
What also matters as context is why Aleppo fell / was retaken by the Assad government in 2016, which was the role of heavy Russian air support. If you remember the 2015 Russian SU-25 shootdown by Turkey, that was a result of the Russian aircraft violating Turkish airspace in the general Aleppo air area. Those bombings were heavy, even decisive, but also highly exposed to Turkish interception if Turkey wanted to. It didn't at the time... but at the time, Russia wasn't heavily committed to the war in Ukraine, nor had it been more or less caught in a foreign sabotage campaign effort which may or may not be attempts to shape upcoming Ukraine negotiations by way of some coercive leverage.
Of course, coercive leverage can exist in multiple domains, and multiple forms. Which gets us to where we are now, and the interesting overlap of foreign interests and angles.
Just from a window of opportunity angle, the Aleppo offensive can be taking advantage of the weakening of two of Assad's most relevant allies- the Ukraine-committed Russian airforce (which has so far done some pro-forma bombings in Aleppo), and the Israel-rattled Hezbollah (which had some of its Syria-based logistics struck just in the last few days- nominally to prevent the rearming within Hezbollah, but coincidentally denying their repurposing to Assad). But from a 'why would its backers want to do so now' perspective, Aleppo may also be a Turkish initiative timed / intended to shape/counter the Russian pressure campaign in Europe, both as a warning not to do the same in Turkey, and a 'gentle' reminder of Turkish interests and influence in the Ukraine resolution.
But of course, that later rational would have applied whether Aleppo changed hands or not... but now that it has largely fallen, and probably succeeded far more than anyone was expected, it brings up the question of how much further the Turkish-backed rebels think they can / should push in this previously unapparent window of opportunity.
Does this mean a re-opening of the Syrian civil war, if local actors see Assad is newly vulnerable without the support of the Ukraine-stretched Russia and the disruption of the Israel-distracted Iranian axis of resistance? Probably not. An offensive started without expectations of huge gains isn't likely to have prepared the resources for such a follow-through, and by the time they are martialed that will also be time for the Syrians and Russians and Iranians to prioritize this problem and reach a new stalemate.
But it is considerably more likely than it was a week ago.
In the last hour there’s been reports of heavy gunfire in Damascus near the armed forces headquarters. There are rumors of an ongoing military coup d’etat.
Asad did reportedly fly to Moscow earlier this week, which is always an opportunity for a palace coup when things get bad.
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