the_others
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User ID: 2680
the_others
5mo ago
Thanks for the studies, especially Lehmann and Smith. It's pretty comforting that the effect sizes all seem to be pretty small, possibly as a result of jury selection pruning the outliers (as you suggested). There does seem to be an overrepresentation of women (though not by as much as I had thought), but perhaps that's not really a problem.
In contrast, groups which are underrepresented on juries because they are disproportionately likely to be face hardship from serving, do have significant impacts on outcomes.
I'm not so sure this is true. Lehmann and Smith looked at race, religiosity, income, gender, and age, and of these traits, I would expect income, gender, and age to be most directly relevant in terms of selection effects before pre-jury selection. Income obviously due to hardship from serving, but also gender for things like being a single parent/sole breadwinner and age as a proxy for retiredness. Race is probably correlated with lots of these things, but I would assume that initial selection is probably less affected by race than by these other factors.
Does anyone have any statistics on the gender composition of juries, particularly in the United States?
I got curious about the question because at some point, I Noticed that in basically every high-profile court case I've paid attention to (which is, granted, not very many), every juror that was ever interviewed or reported upon was a woman. I also have a vague feeling that I've heard the phrases "all-female jury" or "all-woman jury" enough times for them to sound familiar, whereas the male equivalents sound totally alien to me. As a sanity check, I went and looked up the jury composition of some famous criminal trials, and it seemed to agree with my hunch (George Zimmerman's trial had 6 women and 0 men, and Derek Chauvin's trial had 8 women and 4 men). It seems plausible that women would be more likely to end up on juries for a variety of reasons, but it also seems plausible that I'm imagining everything.
When I went about trying to research the topic, the vast majority of jury demographic information out there seemed to be on race. The raw numbers are readily available (for example, here's a breakdown of jurors by race in Massachusetts for 2024 Q1 -- it seems basically proportional to the general population if you account for things like age). There are also commentaries abound about how important racial representation is for equal justice. One of the first Google search results for "juries by demographics" is this lengthy piece titled Race and the Jury, which is your standard mainstream race piece about how black people (and occasionally Hispanic people) are discriminated against in jury selection. Whether it makes a compelling argument is up to the reader, but the point is that these kinds of pieces exist in abundance and that the racial composition of juries is something that people care about. Given how racially charged the issue of policing (or "crime" depending on your viewpoint) is, this makes some amount of sense.
However, when I went to find statistics on the gender composition of juries, they seem almost non-existent. Several states publish data on juror race, but none seem to publish data on juror gender. There were also not as many articles and NGO-type places that seemed interested in the topic. Most of the commentary seems to be historical and unsurprisingly focused on Women as Oppressed Objects. This is perhaps best summed up by the Wikipedia article Women in United States juries, which spends many sections discussing the historical exclusion of women from jury duty while only offering one short paragraph on modern juries:
Today, women frequently serve on juries. In many states, specific exemptions are available for people involved in child care. For example, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon allow exemptions to jury service for nursing mothers.
I was able to find some references to the gender composition of juries in other common law countries. Why there are more men than women on juries says that women made up 45.5% of jurors in the Australian state of Victoria in 2019 (or 2018? I'm not sure which year "last year" is referring to). One piece by the Irish Times says:
An analysis by The Irish Times of 200 trials in the Central Criminal Court, which deals almost exclusively with rape and murder, shows that men dominated the jury in 57 per cent of cases.
Women dominated the jury in only 17 per cent of cases, while there was an even six/six split between the genders in 26 per cent of cases.
The gender imbalance was most noticeable in rape trials, where 61 of 100 juries were dominated by men compared to only 13 dominated by women. To put it another way, 723 men sat on the juries compared to 477 women.
"Dominance" is an admittedly strange way to quantify jury composition that screams p-hacking shenanigans, but the numbers do lean toward men being more common than women.
I don't have a grand point to make, but I thought this could spark some discussion. Some points that came to mind:
- Why does there seem to be a relative paucity of published data on juror gender?
- Do men really outnumber women in juries across the English-speaking world? Or is there publication bias at play, where only cases where women are underrepresented (and therefore can be presented as victims) get news articles written about them?
- Do female jurors and male jurors act differently in important ways? The Irish Times article gives the example that female jurors are more skeptical of rape allegations and are more likely to acquit male defendants.
- If one gender is being selected to juries more often than the other, which side is the "victim"? On the one hand, jury duty is something most people try their best to get out of, but on the other, sitting on a jury is a small bit of actual power that a person can wield over others, albeit with little to no benefit for themselves.
the_others
11mo ago
The comment I originally responded to proposed the following restriction:
And in my view the only legitimate reason that a group that files to be on the ballot should be denied is that they’ve been convicted of a felony within the last 5 years.
The status quo, where Eugene Debs can run for President from prison, is my desired state of things.
the_others
11mo ago
No, I'm questioning why "convicted of a felony" should be connected to "should not appear on a ballot". I firmly believe that criminal background should have no implication on political privileges. Typically this comes up in the context of voting rights for felons (which is left-coded) but I believe the exact same thing when it's a right-aligned cause.
the_others
11mo ago
Barring someone from running for office is not necessarily a lighter punishment than putting someone in prison. When you bar an individual from running, you are not only punishing that one person, but you are also punishing an unbounded number of people who would have otherwise voted for him.
Additionally, different kinds of transgressions disqualify you from different kinds of privileges. It's entirely consistent to say that plagiarism disqualifies you from professorships but not from playing professional baseball, while placing insider bets disqualifies you from playing professional baseball but not from being a professor. Similarly, one can be okay with murderers appearing on the presidential ballot while they sit in prison, provided they are popular enough. It would be entirely consistent to believe that committing murder disqualifies you from not being in prison, but that the only thing that disqualifies you from being on the ballot is not being popular enough to make your appearance worth the overhead.
(That said, I have a very dim view of the law and courts and have generally pro-prison-abolitionist views, so there's that.)
the_others
11mo ago
And in my view the only legitimate reason that a group that files to be on the ballot should be denied is that they’ve been convicted of a felony within the last 5 years.
That seems like one of the least legitimate reasons to deny access to the ballot. "Convicted of a felony" is just another way of saying "the people currently in power, some of whom have explicit allegiances to other political parties, have determined that they think you really, really suck."
If we're going to restrict ballot access based off anything, it should be popularity, based solely on the idea that spending ballot space on someone who is unlikely to win is a waste of resources.
the_others
1yr ago
That depends on whether the decision applies retroactively, which can be complicated.
Why wouldn't every decision apply retroactively? When a court interprets a law in a precedent-setting way, isn't the idea that the law is and has always been that way, and that earlier courts had simply gotten it wrong? If this specific case of SFFA v. Harvard had featured a specific plaintiff, wouldn't that person be entitled to damages? If so, why that person and not others? It seems to me that all decisions of this nature must be applied retroactively by virtue of the fact courts typically rule on events that happened in the past.
Decades? Certainly not, because of statute of limitations issues.
That's fair. We can limit it to the last few years. I don't think this changes much.
Even more importantly, a given applicant would have to prove that he or she would have been admitted, if not for the affirmative action policy, which would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.
This takes me back to my original point, which is that if this is truly the case, then the law isn't If You Discriminate On The Basis Of Race Then You Have To Pay That Person Some Amount of Money. It's If You Discriminate On The Basis Of Race Then Nothing Happens To You Because No One Person Can Prove Anything. I appreciate you educating me on tort law (I mean this sincerely; sorry if I come across as combative but I do appreciate the lesson on something I know very little about) but it's kind of irrelevant if we never get to the point where damages are being calculated.
That said, is the standard of proof really that an applicant has to show that they would have been admitted but for their race? For employment discrimination, as far as I'm aware, you don't have to prove that you would have been hired/not-fired but for your race/sex/etc. You only need to prove that your protected group status was a significant factor in the decision. Is university admissions different, and if so, is that difference spelled out in law?
I can assure you that that is not the case. First of all, why you think courts have discretion not to take a case is beyond me.
Maybe "take a case" is not the step where attempts at justice are thwarted, but my impression is that it is often the case that people are in theory legally entitled to some compensation but cannot reach the point where a court issues a decision on their complaint. My point is that in order for "AA is illegal" to be true, there must be a reliable way for an entity that engages in AA to be penalized for that violation, and from what you said and what I see, it doesn't look like that will be the case.
the_others
1yr ago
No, that is not quite right. We know what types of remedies are available for torts. That is quite well established. What we don't know is what the damages will be in this particular case.
It's not just that we don't know what the damages will be in this specific case, it's also that we don't know what the damages will be in the generic racial-discrimination-in-university-admissions case. At best, we know that the penalty in this case will be a subset of the remedies in tort law, and that in future cases like this one, the remedies will also be a subset of the remedies in tort law, though not necessarily the same subset. This is only slightly more helpful than not knowing anything at all. Knowing that the available remedies for torts are X, Y, and Z is like knowing that the remedies for a foul in soccer are free kicks, penalty kicks, yellow cards, red cards, lifetime ban, etc. The part that you really want to know is what the algorithm is for figuring out which of those remedies applies in any specific case.
Eg: if I am wrongfully denied admission to Harvard, and have to go to Purdue instead, then my damages would be something like the present value the difference between the income I am likely to earn in my life as a Purdue grad versus what I likely would have earned as a Harvard grad. And that, of course, depends on things like my major; if I am a Social Work major, then my damages are going to be less than if I am a Business major, and if I am a Civil Engineering major, I might have no damages at all.
Is this a statement of what you think will happen or is this what you think should happen? That is, do you think that as of this ruling, every White and Asian person who has been rejected from any AA-practicing university in the past few decades will be able to sue successfully for monetary damages equal to the drop in expected earnings they suffered? Alternatively, is there established tort law that says "when a university wrongly denies admission to someone, the damages are to total the loss in expected earnings, no more, no less"?
The reason I'm trying to nail down a specific penalty is because it sounds like the current system is a judge flipping a coin to decide whether to take your case and then pulling a number out of an ass for the damages, which is very much The Rule Is Whatever I Say It Is Because I Am In Charge.
the_others
1yr ago
The reason the penalty was unclear in those hypotheticals is because, in each, there rules were new (in the soccer example)
But it doesn't have to be that way. There's nothing about the nature of laws that requires new laws to omit penalties. The preschool teacher could have provided a penalty when explaining the rules. The fact that they didn't mostly just shows that they are not a good rule writer. This is fine for a soccer game, but for matters of law, we want good rule writers who don't neglect to specify a penalty for breaking their laws.
or had rarely been adjudicated (in the pine tar incident), so there was no existing body of law for the adjudicator to turn to to determine the penalty.
Why should we wait for adjudication to determine a penalty? Why can't the original writers of the rule specify their own penalty? We can't expect perfection, but we should at least prefer better to worse. The pine tar incident is a good example of the flaws of waiting for a ruling to establish a law. When faced with the vague law, the umpire chose a penalty that sounded good to him (the home run doesn't count), which was a pretty clearly bad ruling that caused a bunch of consternation and unhappiness.
You are not correct, or if so are only very technically correct in that I do not know if there has been a remedy announced yet. When a trial court rules against a plaintiff, as the trial court did in the Harvard and UNC cases, but the decision is reversed on appeal, the case goes back to the trial court for further proceedings. The precise further proceedings depend on whether the appeal conclusively decided the case for the defendant*, but if it did, the lower court would conduct proceedings on remedies.
So if I understand you correctly, at this point in time we don't know what the penalty for breaking the "no discrimination" law is, only that the Supreme Court has decided that the "no discrimination" law has been broken. If/when the trial court reaches a verdict in those cases, would that create a precedent for what the penalty is? Or is the meta-law simply that trial courts determine penalties on a case-by-case basis based off what they think is fair? I ask as someone who has very little clue about how the legal system really works.
the_others
1yr ago
There is a third point to having laws that include consequences for breaking them, which I think is relevant in this case. It's to ensure uniformity of treatment, and therefore fairness, among cases. If we end up with a thousand Wang v. Harvards, it could end up that one Wang runs out of money for lawyers and settles for $100, another Wang loses his case due to an incompetent attorney, while a third Wang gets an eight-digit payout. All while a thousand other Wangs go about their lives completely aware that they had the ability to sue. We know from criminal studies that certainty of being caught (and therefore punished) is more important for deterrence than the magnitude of the punishment, and if instead of having a well-known penalty, Harvard is playing the roulette wheel every time they do a discrimination, the deterrence factor is much smaller.
I agree that a massive sue-fest is hyper-American and it appeals to me on a gut level, but I'm not sure the benefits outweigh the way that it obscures what the EV of discriminating is.
the_others
1yr ago
In the US, legislative support for the ruling itself is irrelevant, as when a court makes a ruling, it is basically saying "The law as written is properly interpreted like this. If you don't like it, write a better law." The way that a legislature that disagrees with the ruling would overrule the court is by rewriting the appropriate law.
The executive branch, on the other hand, does have massive power to overrule the courts with immediate effect. John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. My take is that when this power is used as often as it currently is, it's a bad thing for the same reason that The Law Is Whatever I Say It Is Because I Am In Charge is a bad thing. I'll have to check out Hanania's writings.
the_others
1yr ago
This is my first time posting so I hope I'm posting in the right place, following all the local conventions, etc. This is something that I've had on my mind for a while and this seems like one of the only places on the Internet where this kind of thing can go.
I've been thinking about how laws are described, and how lacking and vague they often are.
Imagine you are a preschool teacher, supervising a group of children on the playground. You decide to teach them the rules of soccer. You tell them some of the basic rules, like how there are two teams, and that the goal of the game is to score points by putting the ball into the other team's goal. You also tell them that You Are Not Allowed To Use Your Hands.
As the game begins, you leave to attend to some other business. When you return shortly afterward, all the children come flocking to you. They eagerly clamor to tell you that Johnny broke a rule. Specifically, he used his hand to stop the opposing team from scoring a goal. Johnny readily admits this, adding that he is sorry. One by one, the children line up to tell you what they think should happen.
Alicia says that Johnny should be given five minutes of timeout.
Braden says that Johnny's team should lose the game.
Carrie says that Johnny's opponents should be awarded one "point".
Darren says that Johnny should have to apologize to everyone else and promise never to do it again.
Esther says that Johnny should be banned from playing soccer because he clearly can't follow the rules.
Given the rule that you gave them (You Are Not Allowed To Use Your Hands), which, if any, of the children is correct? There is a correct answer in "real" soccer – Johnny's opponents should be given a free kick (or penalty kick, depending on where the offense occurred) and Johnny should be given a red card for denying a goalscoring opportunity. However, you never told the kids that rule. You only said that You Are Not Allowed To Use Your Hands. There was no way they could have figured out what your intended punishment for the infraction was. There's no reason why their suggestions aren't equally valid, since even though you stated that an action was illegal, you failed to tell them its consequences. Ultimately, you will have to appeal to the meta-rule of The Rule Is Whatever I Say It Is Because I Am The Adult And I Am In Charge, and the children will have a valid grumble about the arbitrariness of your tyrannical rule. However, their suffering is not in vain, as you have learned from this experience and in the future, you will formulate your rules in the form of a trigger ("when someone uses their hands") and a consequence ("the other team gets a free kick"), saving future generations of preschoolers from untold agony.
Okay, great. Some hypothetical preschoolers are unhappy. When has this ever happened in real life?
Take the case of the Pine Tar Incident. On July 24, 1983, the Kansas City Royals played the New York Yankees in a game of baseball. In the eighth inning, Royals third baseman George Brett hit a two-run home run, putting the Royals ahead 5-4. However, opposing manager Billy Martin then pointed out to the umpire that the bat Brett used to hit his home run had pine tar applied in an illegal fashion. Specifically, he contended that Brett violated the following rule:
a bat may not be covered by such a substance [pine tar] more than 18 inches from the tip of the handle
The umpires examined the bat and agreed with Martin, ruling Brett out and his home run void. A whole flurry of events followed, including the Royals lodging a successful protest where the league office overruled the umpire's initial ruling and ordered a replay of the final innings of the game, stating that the appropriate consequence of the infraction was to remove the bat from the game, not overrule the home run that had been hit with it.
The ultimate ruling isn't very important, but the point is that Bats Can Have Pine Tar In Some Places But Not Others is the same kind of rule as You Are Not Allowed To Use Your Hands. It's a bad, ill-formed rule, leading to ad-hoc rulings that leave those involved feeling justifiably aggrieved. A better rule would be something like Bats That Have Pine Tar In The Wrong Places Will Be Removed From The Game. Indeed, Major League Baseball (one of the best-run organizations in terms of writing good rules) has recognized this deficit and has since amended its rule to be along those lines. Other examples of well-formed rules include If The Ball Goes Out Of Play Then The Other Team Gets A Throw-In (in soccer) or If A Pitcher's Socks Are Too Colorful He Has To Change Into Different Socks (in baseball), which both specify a clear trigger and consequence.
Obviously, these concepts apply to laws made by governments just as much as it applies to rules for games. There is a reason why the earliest laws read something like He Who Puts Another's Eye Out Shall Have His Own Eye Put Out and not like Putting Another's Eye Out Is Not Allowed. Transparency is important to having a fair set of laws, and clear consequences provide that transparency. In the case of Hammurabi's code, it means most people can live free from the fear of recreational eye stabbers, since they know that most people will be hesitant to stab eyes if it means getting their own eyes stabbed in return. On the other hand, if the law was Putting Another's Eye Out Is Not Allowed, the question of what the consequence is unanswered. In practice, it would default to The Law Is Whatever I Say It Is Because I Am The King And I Am In Charge, which is significantly more volatile. One would have to keep an eye out (har har) for eye stabbers that were unusually friendly with the king, for example.
How does this relate to the culture war? Well, I was thinking about the recent (okay, not really that recent) Supreme Court ruling on Affirmative Action. Every source I have ever read on the topic has talked about the ruling as something that says You Are Not Allowed To Discriminate On The Basis Of Race without any mention of what the consequences are. For example, the New York Times writes
The Supreme Court on Thursday rejected affirmative action at colleges and universities around the nation, declaring that the race-conscious admissions programs at Harvard and the University of North Carolina were unlawful
Affirmative action is "unlawful", but what exactly is the penalty if someone discriminates on the basis of race? To draw a parallel to the preschool soccer situation above, one can easily imagine five people with the following suggestions:
- Harvard et al. were guilty of discriminating on the basis of race, so they have to promise to stop doing that.
- Harvard et al. were guilty of discriminating on the basis of race, so they have to retroactively admit all the students affected by their discriminatory policy.
- Harvard et al. were guilty of discriminating on the basis of race, so they have to pay back all the federal funding they received during the period of time that the discriminatory policy was in place.
- Harvard et al. were guilty of discriminating on the basis of race, so they must be nationalized.
- Harvard et al. were guilty of discriminating on the basis of race, so all the people involved in perpetuating this discrimination must have their eyes put out.
All these suggestions are completely consistent with You Are Not Allowed To Discriminate On The Basis Of Race. In practice of course, the law defaults to The Law Is Whatever I Say It Is Because I Command A Byzantine Bureaucracy That Will Somewhat Enforce My Demands So I Am Vaguely In Charge. This is exactly the same kind of unclear situation as the handball and pine tar cases, except the stakes are much higher. If you ask various Experts (TM) what the current law actually is (in terms of trigger/consequence), you will only get speculation. Some say that universities will be able to continue to discriminate on the basis of race as long as it's in a way that isn't exactly the same as the way they had been doing in the past, while others say that the effect is slightly larger. No one knows what the law really is until it gets enforced.
On the other hand, there is also the possibility that we actually do know what the law is. After all, if a law is simply a trigger paired with a consequence, we've already witnessed at least one instance of the trigger (a university discriminating on the basis of race) along with the consequence brought about by that trigger (the universities are told nicely to stop doing whatever they were doing). That is, the law isn't You Are Not Allowed To Discriminate On The Basis Of Race, but rather If You Discriminate On The Basis Of Race, We Tell You To Stop Doing That. (As far as I know, the universities have not been penalized or ordered to compensate their victims in any way – if this is incorrect, I would be open to being corrected.)
If I'm right about this kind of law being bad, what can one reasonably do about this? If someone says "The Supreme Court just made affirmative action illegal", should I respond with "That is a non-central usage of the word 'illegal'"? If saying "AA is illegal now" is bad usage, what would be good usage of "X is illegal"? Certainly, there could be some cases where it is useful, as a code of laws can be made easier to understand if you group multiple triggers with the same consequence (for example, multiple actions in soccer are grouped together as "fouls" and have basically the same consequences). The category of "illegal" could be useful in a similar vein, where we group together various triggers that have the consequence "negative things happen to you". We could then exclude things from the "illegal" category if the consequences are not sufficiently bad, like how we don't consider earning income "illegal" even though it results in losing some amount of money through taxes.
I don't know how to end the post so this is the end of the post.
One interesting thing about ABH (2022) is that they find that white defendants don't get lower conviction rates from black jurors, conflicting with what was found in L&S, which concluded that black jurors reduced conviction rates for all defendants by roughly equal rates.
My initial hunch for explaining why black jurors would be more favorable to the defendant would have to do with a general skepticism of the system among black people (which would also help white defendants), but if the black juror effect only happens with black defendants, then a more in-group style explanation would make more sense. But this is all just speculation on my part.
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