Rebecca Tuvel's 2017 publication in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy drew heated controversy and shed light on the cannibalistic nature of modern progressive thought. The thrust of the paper is that "considerations that support transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism," and on this basis it should be equally acceptable for one to transition race as it is for one to transition gender. Rather than defuse the argument through rational discourse, there were instead widespread calls for the paper to be retracted and its author was excoriated on social media. Numerous editors and directors of Hypatia resigned or were replaced.
The thrust of the argument is thus: transition between identities is predicated on both how an individual feels - their self-identification - as well as society's willingness to honour it. In the case of gender there is no question (amongst certain sects of society), but in the case of race societal acceptance is close to nonexistent. Objections to the latter amount to disputing whether or not it is possible to feel like another race, or whether it is even possible to change race at all; arguments of the first kind amount to disputes regarding biology, that, even if resolved, "should" be independent of whether or not society should find such behaviours acceptable, while arguments of the second are rooted in the observation that biological attributes of one's person are mutable, while the historical fact of their ancestry is not.
Yet, as a social construct, ancestry is just one determinant of race that intersubjectively has been chosen by society as predominant; there is no reason, a priori, that it should be the primary determinant. Indeed, given the precedent set by society in loosening its criteria for what constitutes gender, it similarly ought to be possible to loosen such criteria for race, and to consider other factors beyond ancestry such as lived experience, culture, upbringing, and indeed self-identification. All such criteria are merely social agreements, and one can imagine a genuinely transracial individual facing persecution at the hands of a society intolerant of their condition, much in the same way transgender individuals only a few short years ago did until societal attitudes towards traditional gender roles and concepts were adjusted. Further objections on ethical grounds include harm done to marginalized races, through either insult and bad-faith, fraudulent appropriation, or the exercise of privilege across an imbalance of power between races.
Enter Canada
The Globe and Mail recently published an article regarding the NunatuKavut Community Council, which, on the basis of self-identification alone, "has received nearly $74-million in federal funding for Indigenous programs or projects related to their claims of Indigenous identity since 2010" - claims which are widely disputed: "They aren’t recognized as Inuit by any other federally recognized, rights-holding Inuit collective," and thus fail Tuvel's second criterion of trans acceptance: society's willingness to honour the identity.
Naturally, the NunatuKavut community affirms its own self-identification: “We know who our grandfathers are. We know where we come from," consequently upholding the prevailing cultural notion that ancestry is a key determinant of race. In which case, should it not be possible for the NunatuKavut to furnish genealogical and/or genetic proof of their ancestry?
Natan Obed, president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, "worries a risk-averse federal government does not want to be seen as judging who is and is not Indigenous." This harkens back to similar arguments, now regarded as transphobic, that one should be required to furnish biological proof of their gender, in the form of chromosomes, gametes, or any other number of physical markers. Why should the government need to concern itself with the genitalia or DNA of the citizenry? Tuvel herself notes,
Therefore, anyone who suggests that all women share some biologically based feature of experience that sheds light on a shared psychological experience will have to show not only that biological sex gives rise to a particular gendered psychology, but that there is something biological that all women share.
... evoking "what is a woman" type questions that have already been litigated ad nauseam. Yet she continues, drawing parallels with biological and genetic accounts of race, which are similarly nonsensical:
If the biological account of race were true, this might pose a problem for the possibility of changing one’s race. However, racial groupings of people are arbitrary from a genetic point of view. That is, they are no more genetically similar than random groupings of racially diverse individuals; indeed, we now know that more genetic variation exists within any one racial group than between racial groups (Lewontin 1972, 397).
And although some biologists insist there are genetic differences between human groupings, the human groupings they have in mind do not result from our current racial categories (Blum 2002, 143). If we were to follow these biologists’ racial groupings, then, it will turn out that many of us are in some sense “lying” about our races.
There is also the matter of growing up with the lived experience of marginalization and disadvantage, similarly to how Rachel Dolezal, a white woman who transitioned to the black race, underwent "the humiliating experience of having her hair searched by the TSA and of being subject to police harassment as a black woman (Nashrulla, Griffin, and Dalrymple 2015)." Should society not weight such experiences more heavily in the determination of one's race, irrespective of the accidentals of their ancestry? Having already dispensed with notions of biology in the account of gender, should we not dispense with notions of ancestry in the account of race? Race, as Tuvel establishes, is itself a social construct, and we have arbitrarily decided upon ancestry as a primary determinant of it; yet:
If ancestry is a less emphasized feature in some places (for example, in Brazil), then Dolezal’s exposure to black culture, experience living as someone read as black, and her self-identification could be sufficient to deem she is black in those places. And because there is no fact of the matter about her “actual” race from a genetic standpoint, these features of Dolezal’s experience would be decisive for determining her race in that particular context. The crucial point here is that no “truth” about Dolezal’s “real” race would be violated."
The NunatuKavut's about page tells a similar tale of colonialism and marginalization:
Like all Indigenous peoples in Canada, we too, suffered the effects of colonialism. Outsiders pillaged our resources, brought their own form of government, denied our language and many of our people experienced resettlement and residential schools.
Their story page is replete with historical and cultural artifacts chronicling their story as an Indigenous people:
Hundreds of NunatuKavut Inuit children, as well as children from other areas of Labrador, attended residential schools in the Cartwright area between 1920 and 1964.
While some enjoyed the experience, many felt isolated and neglected. Some even endured physical or sexual abuse. The schools were designed to transform and “improve” the children by separating them from the influence of their communities and by teaching them British and American social values and behaviours. Instead, many simply learned to feel ashamed of their families and Inuit heritage and suffered from being disconnected from home.
If society sees fit to heed such stories of hardship, abuse, and marginalization often ascribed to Indigenous peoples, and yet continues to gatekeep race on the basis of documentation or ancestry, then perhaps it is the societal norm that ought to be changed. Otherwise we run into dilemmas reminiscent of individuals assigned male at birth who identify as women and yet face persecution due to a lack of societal tolerance for their transgender self-identification, on the basis of biology or otherwise.
“Why would you want to take food out of the mouths of our people? Why would you want to hurt our people and our communities?”
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Revisiting In Defence of Transracialism
Rebecca Tuvel's 2017 publication in Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy drew heated controversy and shed light on the cannibalistic nature of modern progressive thought. The thrust of the paper is that "considerations that support transgenderism seem to apply equally to transracialism," and on this basis it should be equally acceptable for one to transition race as it is for one to transition gender. Rather than defuse the argument through rational discourse, there were instead widespread calls for the paper to be retracted and its author was excoriated on social media. Numerous editors and directors of Hypatia resigned or were replaced.
The thrust of the argument is thus: transition between identities is predicated on both how an individual feels - their self-identification - as well as society's willingness to honour it. In the case of gender there is no question (amongst certain sects of society), but in the case of race societal acceptance is close to nonexistent. Objections to the latter amount to disputing whether or not it is possible to feel like another race, or whether it is even possible to change race at all; arguments of the first kind amount to disputes regarding biology, that, even if resolved, "should" be independent of whether or not society should find such behaviours acceptable, while arguments of the second are rooted in the observation that biological attributes of one's person are mutable, while the historical fact of their ancestry is not.
Yet, as a social construct, ancestry is just one determinant of race that intersubjectively has been chosen by society as predominant; there is no reason, a priori, that it should be the primary determinant. Indeed, given the precedent set by society in loosening its criteria for what constitutes gender, it similarly ought to be possible to loosen such criteria for race, and to consider other factors beyond ancestry such as lived experience, culture, upbringing, and indeed self-identification. All such criteria are merely social agreements, and one can imagine a genuinely transracial individual facing persecution at the hands of a society intolerant of their condition, much in the same way transgender individuals only a few short years ago did until societal attitudes towards traditional gender roles and concepts were adjusted. Further objections on ethical grounds include harm done to marginalized races, through either insult and bad-faith, fraudulent appropriation, or the exercise of privilege across an imbalance of power between races.
Enter Canada
The Globe and Mail recently published an article regarding the NunatuKavut Community Council, which, on the basis of self-identification alone, "has received nearly $74-million in federal funding for Indigenous programs or projects related to their claims of Indigenous identity since 2010" - claims which are widely disputed: "They aren’t recognized as Inuit by any other federally recognized, rights-holding Inuit collective," and thus fail Tuvel's second criterion of trans acceptance: society's willingness to honour the identity.
Naturally, the NunatuKavut community affirms its own self-identification: “We know who our grandfathers are. We know where we come from," consequently upholding the prevailing cultural notion that ancestry is a key determinant of race. In which case, should it not be possible for the NunatuKavut to furnish genealogical and/or genetic proof of their ancestry?
Natan Obed, president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, "worries a risk-averse federal government does not want to be seen as judging who is and is not Indigenous." This harkens back to similar arguments, now regarded as transphobic, that one should be required to furnish biological proof of their gender, in the form of chromosomes, gametes, or any other number of physical markers. Why should the government need to concern itself with the genitalia or DNA of the citizenry? Tuvel herself notes,
... evoking "what is a woman" type questions that have already been litigated ad nauseam. Yet she continues, drawing parallels with biological and genetic accounts of race, which are similarly nonsensical:
There is also the matter of growing up with the lived experience of marginalization and disadvantage, similarly to how Rachel Dolezal, a white woman who transitioned to the black race, underwent "the humiliating experience of having her hair searched by the TSA and of being subject to police harassment as a black woman (Nashrulla, Griffin, and Dalrymple 2015)." Should society not weight such experiences more heavily in the determination of one's race, irrespective of the accidentals of their ancestry? Having already dispensed with notions of biology in the account of gender, should we not dispense with notions of ancestry in the account of race? Race, as Tuvel establishes, is itself a social construct, and we have arbitrarily decided upon ancestry as a primary determinant of it; yet:
The NunatuKavut's about page tells a similar tale of colonialism and marginalization:
Their story page is replete with historical and cultural artifacts chronicling their story as an Indigenous people:
If society sees fit to heed such stories of hardship, abuse, and marginalization often ascribed to Indigenous peoples, and yet continues to gatekeep race on the basis of documentation or ancestry, then perhaps it is the societal norm that ought to be changed. Otherwise we run into dilemmas reminiscent of individuals assigned male at birth who identify as women and yet face persecution due to a lack of societal tolerance for their transgender self-identification, on the basis of biology or otherwise.
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