Wavesacross
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User ID: 1910
All in all, I don't really see what you are driving at with this:
Because it allows to speak in universally. To go back to your newton's law example:
Every object in the universe attracts every other object toward it with a force proportional to the product of their masses, divided by the square of the distance between their centers of mass.
We can say this with confidence, because this law is a consequence of what mass is, mathematically. The law was determined empirically, and you are correct that if it was a purely empirical conclusion, we could never truly speak confidently about everything in the universe. But we've since discovered that this law is consequence of the mathematical definition of mass. If something has "mass" as defined by certain mathematics, then it must attract every object as you quote.
What would it mean for an object not too? Well I can imagine two possibilities.
- Either something else is at play, aside from mass. For example two protons will not appear to attract each other as such, because the also have an electric charge which will repel them, but that attraction is still there, its just countered by the electromagnetic force.
or
- We are wrong about the mathematical structure of mass. This has happened, and the classic example the precession of mercury. But if we can be confidant about what the math, of mass is, then we can be confidant about the behavior of mass universally, and unless you embrace philosophical skepticism, which you claim not too, I don't see why we can be confidant in the math.
If you are an EA buff
The thing is I'm not. I've just read Scott's posts regularly, and the occasional link from his subreddit, yet even I knew enough to know they understood the concept of a qaly.
And then by doing a two second google search for: "qaly" mosquito nets site:givewell.org I found this:
I have no idea how rigorous it is, but it at least seems the information you are looking for can be easily found if you put in a modicum of effort.
Yes, that is what I believe...
Okay, but then I don't see how your whole argument isn't really just an argument against empiricism in general.
can establish otherwise.
Is there any way we can establish anything?
Like if I put a coin in front of you do you believe is there anything we can do to come to any sort of quantifiable belief about it (with out miracles)?
You claim not to be arguing philosophical skepticism, but I don't see how not. What knowledge of the world can we have?
You singled out physical/universal laws as specifically needing miracles to have justified belief in, but unless I misunderstand you, your position is really that we need miracles to have justified belief about everything in the world, not just universal physical laws.
we saved three hours of life. This is the way anyone with a smidgeon of actuarial expertise thinks about "saving lives" -- in terms of saving days of life, not "averting deaths", and the Givewell and Lesswrong people either know that or ought to know it.
I can't imagine you've spent any time in the EA community and never encountered the concept of the QALY. So yes, they do know it.
Either your being dishonest or you've hardly spent anytime reading anything they've written.
The analysis and language around it is either incompetent or deceptive
Or your wrong that:
talking about "averting deaths" in their public facing literature is deliberately deceptive because it strongly suggests "saving lives"
That's your opinion. Mine is that anyone who can understand the rest of the article can understand the difference.
It soured me and I didn't look much further
Oh. Ok then.
But the law says that everything orbiting everything in the universe
I've been very clear I am talking about only the planets in our solar system.
Do you honestly believe that we can't say, by study of the motion of say, the planets of our solar system, be justified in believing a theory about the motion of the planets (and only the planets).I am not talking about everything in the universe.
They don't even support the conclusion that the law continued to hold at each of the infinitely many times between when you took your measurements.
Okay, I guess not, but again, I don't understand how this isn't different from arguing against empiricism in general?
By your logic why can't I say that you have no justified belief the moon isn't made of cheese, because it could be cheese in the infinitely many moments when your not looking at it?
I do not claim to believe that the coin will flip heads, much less that it is a universal law
I'm not asking anything about universal law or if it will flip heads. If I put a coin in front of you, is there anything you can do to come with some quantifiable belief about it?
To reiterate my point, on your initial post you went to great emphasis to single out belief in the universality of physical laws as uniquely flawed, yet if I understand your logic correctly it seems there is no belief about reality (universal or not) can be quantifiably justified, is that correct?
My argument is that I do not know of an inference rule that would permit this without begging the question and I have looked diligently (abductive inference).
Why don't you hold your self to the same standard you hold others? You demand they prove their math, but we are supposed to believe you because you "looked diligently"?
Why don't you prove:
z can never be 1 for any finite number of observations, no matter how small the desired confidence c is, unless c = 0
Then we can return to the discussion. Until then your whole argument rests on something you have no proof for.
However, I do not see any objective reason (short of a miracle) to have nonzero confidence that Kepler's' equations are always exactly true, or even always approximately (to within specified tolerances).
I mean, we know they are not always true, but you can certainly measure how far a planet's position deviates from that as predicted by Kepler's laws after some time.
It will be mathematically impossible for you to produce a nonzero posterior probability if you do not have a nonzero prior
I will point out this is another claim you've provided no proof for.
Statistics
Again, I am not seeing how this differs from skepticism in general. Like take your point about Bayesian statistics, forget universal physical laws, can you come up with an objective, quantifiable number of confidence for whether a coin will flip heads?
I've been very careful to not give them a name, for good reason. There may well be objects in the box that behave differently. I am not talking about those objects.
But of those in the box which follow the same rules as the one's we've pulled out of the box, can we say they also have an internal angle of 180 degrees?
I agree there is no statistical rule, but why do we need one? Via math if a simple polygon is three sided, it has an internal angle of 180 degrees.
However, that is not a theorem about the physical world and it is not known whether or not the space we live in satisfies the axioms of Euclidean geometry.
I am not talking about our world, we have no box of infinite polygons in our world. This is a thought experiment. And yes, the polygons are Euclidean, as I said we are pulling simple polygons out of the box.
Can we make a "universal law" about the angles of all three sided polygons in the infinite box?
I agree no observational evidence could prove this (which I think is your point regarding physics), that is no, number of observations of three sided polygons with 180 degrees could justify our belief that all the three sided polygons in the box have an internal angle of 180 degrees. But surely the math can?
When experts communicate with other experts in post-enlightenment scholarly discourse, appeals to authority are verboten.
Sorry, but no. We are on an internet forum. Asking:
If you claim something is a theorem, show me the proof. If you claim something is experimentally verified, describe the experimental design and its results. What we have here is an appeal to authority claiming that the theory is "backed by math and logic"
It is absolutely ridiculous and comes across as raising your standards so as to avoid engaging with the argument, to ask people to describe the experimental design or the math of matters well settled in physics. That can be pages, and pages of work, it is ridiculous to ask for it, on an internet forum, especially, when if you honestly want it, a five second google search will suffice, You want to play this game? Two can do so.
You say:
z can never be 1 for any finite number of observations, no matter how small the desired confidence c is, unless c = 0
Well where is your proof for this?
But no, rather then demanding proof for this, I accepted it.
Besides, what value is there in doing so for physics? We already know you do not believe the work the scientific community has done is sufficient to prove true, the laws in discussion, if you did, we would not be having that discussion, so what value is in there in reiterating it?
I do not believe we can, without a prodigious leap of faith in the power of the human mind relative to the complexity of Nature, unjustified by any articulable, objective reason.
Really? You went to great effort to single out universal laws as specifically unbelievable, rather than coming down on empiricism in general. Do you honestly believe that we can't say, by study of the motion of say, the planets of our solar system, be justified in believing a theory about the motion of the planets (and only the planets)? If not, is there an
Finally I've made an argument I am confident proves you incorrect, but to which you have not engaged.
Say we are pulling polygons out of an infinite box of simple polygons. We notice that every polygon with three sides, has an internal angle of 180 degrees. Our observations inspire us to a mathematical proof that every three sided polygon has an internal angle of 180 degrees. Would we be justified in believing that every three sided polygon in the box, has an internal angle of 180 degrees?
This is relevant because this is how we can truly justify belief in universal laws in physics, but I would like to know your opinion on the polygon idea before I do the further of work of going into the physics.
An appeal to authority is warranted here, rebutting your argument doesn't actually hinge on the truth of the theory, it hinges on whether it is possible for experimental evidence to justify a belief in the correspondence of a theory and reality. If it does there are cases where the logic of the theory enforces universality.
To wit, taking Newton's law as an example (and supposing we only knew classical mechanics), would we be justified in saying that the masses we observe behave as per his theory?
I'm not saying universally, merely the things we've observed locally.
If so, it turns out there are other cases, where if we are justified in believing the theory, the theory says things about the universe as a whole.
If you don't believe we can go from experimental evidence to justified belief in theory, then we have bigger problems.
My response would be what I've been driving at, regarding math.
Say we are pulling (Euclidean) polygons out of a box of infinite polygons. We observe that every time we pull out a three sided polygon, the polygon has an internal angel of 180 degrees. I agree with you that no number of observations of three sided polygons can let us conclude "every three sided polygon in the box has an internal angle of 180 degrees".
However, our observations can do is drive us to the mathematics of polygons, and what we can do is use math to show that if a polygon has three sides, then it's internal angle must be 180 degrees. This then lets us conclude that every three sided polygon in the box, has an internal angle of 180 degrees.
Consider electric charge. I agree that no number of observations of quantized electric charge could prove that electric charge is quantized everywhere. But if we are right that the gauge group of the electromagnetic field is U(1), then we can say that every electric charge is quantized.
This seems like mostly a discussion of definitions. To me, what justifies the claim that failing to find a counter example makes the hypothesis more likely is statistics.
Regardless, I don't see how abductive inference solves the problem, if you claim that the laws of physics are crows. Why does abductive inference let me say "all crows are black" when I try hard to find non-black crows, what is the logic?
Anyways, the laws of physics are decidedly not crows. We can generalize about them because they can be mapped to mathematical constructs, crows can not. That is, we can make a universal law about electrons because what an electron is, is fixed by the mathematics of the theory. Now, we could be wrong about the theory, but if we are right then we can say things like "every electron has a charge of E", not because we looked and saw only electrons with charge E, but because the math says it is.
I get that when the sample set is unbounded/the known is unbound we can not define a hard number to some confidence of a hypothesis about that set, but I don't see how the principle of abductive inference isn't a statistical argument. Isn't it just some kind of logic similar to a Bayesian update? You have some hypothesis, every time time you fail to find a counter example that is evidence for the hypothesis. Isn't it just as flawed when dealing with a potentially infinite number of crows?
Also, isn't a fundamental difference between crows, and physics, is that we expect there to be universal laws? That is, we have no reason to believe there is a universal law governing the color of crows, but we do believe there are for how objects behave, right?
I take for granted that the universe is governed by unchanging laws
Next, I would suggest that the mathematical foundations of physics give reason to believe in universal laws. That is the laws of physics are deeply related and not as arbitrary as I think you imagine.
Its kind of like if you said "All Euclidean triangles have an internal angle of 180 degrees". And I said, "Well I can imagine a triangle with 181 degrees." I might think that I can imagine a Euclidean triangle with 181 degrees, but really I can't.
If we were pulling Euclidean polygons out of a box, I think you would be justified in saying "all triangles in the box have an internal angle of 180 degrees". This would have started out as an empirical observation, we would have pulled out polygon after polygon out of the box, counted the sides, and measured the angles, and noticed that the ones with 3 sides always had 180 degrees. However eventually someone would have discovered the mathematics that justifies saying all triangles have 180 degrees.
However, at the same time, it could be true that some of what we thought were triangles, weren't. Maybe they had a microscopic fourth side.
If we are pulling triangles out of the box, then they all have 180 degrees, and we will never see one that doesn't. But maybe they aren't triangles. And it turns out that the laws of physics are very, very much like this.
crows
Sure, I get the crows,and have an opinion on it too, but I thought you were making a point about justification for physical laws uniquely?
Is there something that singles out the laws of physics as uniquely unjustifiable, or are you simply saying that you can't prove a physical law the same way you can't prove all crows are black?
I'm interested but not sure I understand your argument.
If inductive reasoning is valid why can't we go from "all observed masses follow Newton's law" to "therefore all masses follow Newton's law."?
Simply because there could be an object that doesn't?
I mean yes, there could be (in fact, we know there are), but assuming I don't know that Newton's Law fails, that I've only ever seen otherwise, why am I not justified in believing it?
It could be that even yesterday, there were unobserved exceptions to any physical law we think we know. In fact, the point of my argument is that we have no (non-miraculous) reason to doubt that there were.
I don't understand how this is different from skepticism in general. Like if I believe that apple pies can't spontaneously appear or disappear, by your reasoning do I have any non miraculous reason to believe that?
The so-called "scientific method" is, I think, very poorly understood.
Or you misunderstand everyone else's understanding of the scientific method.
The most common answers to these questions are "yes"
This shows you are talking to people with a layman's understanding of science, or people with more education who are speaking colloquially.
Anyone who has more than a high school education of physics should answer "No", if taking you literally.
Your whole post is predicated on a misconception that the things in science we have named "laws" are thought to be the rules of the universe, they aren't. Newton's law of universal gravitation isn't even universal, it fails in our own solar system, it doesn't correctly describe the orbit of mercury.
that any law held universally, without exception. And isn't that exactly what laws of nature are supposed to do?
No.
For Pete's sake it is called the law of universal gravitation, and it begins with the universal quantifier every
Don't take it's name so literally.
What if your mom/sibling/dad was a therapist? Is therapy not work?
I suppose you could go in the other direction and say it is not. It's a paid friendship or something of the sort.
So then why does the same not apply to Gay men? Gay men have counts way higher than straight men. Are gay men not only gay, but also more interested in getting laid in general? More than straight men?
I don't think Gay men have sex drives that different from Straight men, aside from orientation obviously. Rather the the fact that they have so much casual sex is because it's far easier for them to hook up with other men, then it is for straight men to hook up with women.
A crawl of student bars in the nearest major city or college town is more than enough for the dedicated, average, late-teens-to-mid-20s American male with the most basic social skills to get laid, at least on balance over a few nights.
It's not actually hard, and I don't see why we're pretending that it is.
I completely disagree and think that it is hard. Men want to get laid. If it wasn't hard and men could get laid on the regular, average partner counts would be much higher.
So either young men must value monogamy much more than society suggests, or they must not be aware that they can bar crawl a few nights to get laid.
Or, it is in fact hard.
Like in if we are in a world where it only takes a few nights of bar crawling to get laid... Why are not in a world where the average 20 something has a partner counts in the 20s or 30s? 3 nights a week, a couple times a month, most months a year? That will add up over the years.
There's more to picking up girls from a bar than "make eye contact and tell funny stories".
Like other posters if you have women approaching you regularly, I have a hard time believing you are in the 60-70th percentile.
Unless you are in a high socio-sexuality environment, full of men and women who both don't conventional dating norms (ex women are more likely to take initiative), if you are, and it sounds like you may be then I could believe it. Also if as you say your peers are unconventional, it would be wrong to generalize from your experience to most men.
I think it's it a mistake to think they are lying and then say you know their true motives they themselves are unaware of.
A simpler explanation is this. You agree that a woman who uses public transit everyday will at some point experience harassment.
Some women will be unfortunate enough for this to occur in their first few rides.
Some of those women will then decide not to ride public transit anymore. This does not mean that the rate of harassment is high enough that every woman is likely to be harassed in 5 or 10 rides. But some will.
I also think it's perfectly plausible you just haven't noticed the harassment. You only see a small slice of the daily commute and not all forms of harassment are going catch your eye.
Ex, a woman gets off your train, to get the next, to avoid a man, and the man follows her. Your not going to see that, from your perspective it will just look like two people, among others getting off your train at the same station.
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There is a very real sense is that this is determined by the mathematical structure of what mass is. I can make that argument, as I said,
If you would like me to, but I think its incidental to the real argument we are debating, which is, can we be justified in believing in universal laws?
My point is that while the laws of physics are discovered empirically, what lets us be justified in speaking universally of them, is math.
If all we had was empirical observations, I agree those empirical observations of "mass behaving in X way" would not allow us to conclude "everything with mass behaves in X way".
However, we can instead identify mass, as a certain mathematical structure, where the "must behave in X way" follows as a consequence of the math.
Then we can speak universally, because when we say "all things with mass behave in X way" we are saying "all things with this mathematical structure behave in X way".
If we can be confidant about what the math, of mass is, then we can be confidant about the behavior of mass universally, and unless you embrace philosophical skepticism, which you claim not too, I don't see why we can be confidant in the math.
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