SuperFree
2yr ago
Ditto, and Minotaur's comment didn't really make it clearer for me. I think that given that this is described as an understanding that "only a small number of people reach", it should have considerably more explanation than levels 1 and 2.
SuperFree
2yr ago
I think the issue with these theories is missing information. I will just list a few categories questions that seem pertinent here.
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How does this work contractually? That is, how long a contract did Germany sign for NS 1? What are the consequences for Germany for breaking their contractual agreements with Russia aside from not getting gas? Are the payments more like my utility bill, or is there a sum agreed on at the signing of a contract for [X period of time] where Germany pays a fixed amount on some schedule provided Russia isn't found in violation of the contract? What penalties would a force majeure spare Russia, how long can such penalties be stalled/contested, how can they be collected and how do they stack up to the amount of frozen Russian assets or war damages that may be demanded at the conclusion of this conflict?
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How badly does Germany need Russian gas? One of the pipelines is undamaged, but it's part of the unapproved NS 2. What parts of its agreement with the U.S. and/or U.S. sanctions would Germany be violating by certifying it? What would doing that mean for U.S. Germany relations? How badly does Russia need the money from these pipelines vs the leverage against Germany?
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What was the immediate cause of the explosions? Planted explosives, drones, accident? Which of these options can be excluded from being available to a country like Poland or Estonia? What are the actual surveillance and investigative capabilities of the countries watching the Baltic Sea? What is the outlook on repairing the pipelines - how possible is it, how much can it cost, how quickly can it be done? How possible is it for a party interested in the continued operation of these pipelines to prevent this problem in the future?
Spinning theories through the possible answers to these questions is making my head dizzy. For example, if execution is hard and chance of being found responsible is very low, that narrows it down to Russia or some of the NATO countries. If, furthermore, the certification of NS 2 would be a large cost to Germany-U.S. relations and Russia needs the money far more than they need any leverage over Germany while the latter really needs the gas, and if, furthermore, any contract for gas supply would have to be made for multiple years, and if Germany cannot be expected to force the breaking of such a contract, then it could be a way for Germany to get full gas supply from Russia by making NS 2 politically possible and then also getting gas through NS 1 if it's repaired and making it look like their hands are tied by contracts. On the other hand, there are a lot of variables here that would single-handedly break this theory if the answer is something else.
SuperFree
2yr ago
Hard to take seriously an article that asserts:
[Putin] was almost surely behind the sabotage of the natural gas pipelines reported by the Swedish and Danish authorities
and moreover, implies that the next best competing explanation is:
to expose the vulnerability of European infrastructure to clandestine Russian sabotage
I don't just mention this because I find the current arguments for these allegations to be really poor, but because Russia right now is talking about the possibility of repairing the pipeline. The Anglosphere seems motivated to put forward the version that these pipelines are done for while Russia is claiming the fix can be made in as little as a matter of days. That doesn't support the theory that Russia is trying to signal a complete point of no return. In effect, all we have is mobilization and annexation, which Russia has already done before. This looks like an exit move. We have all the ammo we need to win the PR war. Russia had to institute a mobilization to fight little Ukraine, Russia captured much less than they had set out to, Russia's pipelines are gone, NATO expanded, and our official stated objective is simply to bleed Russia dry, which we can easily say we did. We humiliated them by just sending our old equipment over. I just don't see nukes happening because for us this is just a sliding scale of how hard we want to win, not an actual objective to restore Ukraine's borders.
SuperFree
2yr ago
"Why do people frequently claim something clearly specious (group rates of discrimination) to explain (one particular set of) group differences, when literally minutes of thought and research is enough to disprove it?"
So you're asking why is politics political?
I would surmise that the literal answer to your question is that most people simply don't find it worth their time to research an answer to this question. I would also contest that this explanation is really so specious that it can be summarily dismissed after a minimum amount of thinking and research. First, I simply doubt that you've actually looked at "literally any other group" and found no exception to the claim that historical discrimination is not the primary driver of group outcomes. I could, for example, bring up the example of Indian untouchables, who have faced de jure and continue to face unspoken caste-based discrimination and still lag behind privileged castes. Second, I don't believe that success in the face of discrimination proves its relative irrelevance in general. Consider a commonly offered explanation that Ashkenazi Jews are simply more intelligent than native Europeans and exhibit stronger enthnocentrism. Let's say that's true - well then, it may be the case that AJs are a special exception. They may have had the tools to thrive despite oppression that a group without such an advantage did not. I can foresee you claiming that this is special pleading, but to make a case for special pleading you'd need to already have a firmly established general pattern from which someone wants to claim exception. Can you list more than just Jews who have had to face a comparable level of oppression for that long in the country where they are the minority and came out on top or at least at parity? Third, it does not seem obvious at all as to what is the appropriate scale for answering this question. Jews have been in Europe for centuries. As recently as the 19th century, prominent individuals not especially invested in furthering a bigoted agenda like deutsch physik felt comfortable making the claim that Jews were of manifestly inferior intelligence to the native European. Were they simply ignorant, bigoted without cause, accurately assessing the apparent state of affairs at the time? When exactly since the departure from their homeland did Jews go from lagging to ahead? Moreover, should one factor in that a group identity like religion (and a preserved common language) could operate across borders while something like race, less so? Should one consider the size of the minority group at all? Fourth, I don't see any clear way to disentangle discrimination from other explanations. It seems just as plausible to me that, say, alleged Jewish ethnocentrism could be an evolved cultural response to oppression as a pre-existing protective factor. It seems plausible to me that persistent discrimination could have kept African Americans more localized in the initially poor South and that compound effects of being in a poorer part of the country and facing vicious discrimination could have done more damage than expected from a simple composition of those factors. Fifth, how do you even define a group? Do you differentiate them by how they immigrated? By some sort of measure of the interconnections in their social network? Genetically?
I don't think finding satisfactory answers to those questions, even limiting it to satisfactory relative to what conclusions can be drawn from extant knowledge (which may very well fall short of a more general standard for what is satisfactory), is going to be anywhere south of at least 100 hours of research. So, if I had to answer someone like you in a setting where my real identity is attached, I'd make the simple calculation that the generic, safe answer nets me the social win and a more detailed answer is simply not worth the time since it won't be actionable or necessary to socially defeat you. I imagine I'm not the only one with that position.
So some fact gathering that I did...
Last year, Nordstream 1 supplied 59 billion cubic meters of gas. A little over its stated capacity.
In 2015, a disabled explosive remote controlled vehicle was found near the pipeline off the coast of the island of Öland.
Nordstream 2 and Turkstream are viewed by some as strategic projects rather than strictly economic. That is, it is not so much that these pipelines had to be built as much as Russia wished to avoid routing its gas through Ukraine.
At least 2 of the leaks occurred in the Swedish economic zone, and Sweden does have and did exercise the right to exclude Russia from investigating the leaks. Sweden stated that they have made seizures on the site which they consider sufficient to make the case for sabotage and are looking into determining whether suspect can be identified based on what was found.
Gazprom, in which the Russian government has a 50.002% share also has a 51% share in the distinctly non-slavic sounding Nord Stream project. The remaining 4 shareholders make no mention of any degree of state ownership.
The war is expensive for Russia, exports have declined, and estimates are that it's costing Russia $1 billion daily. Forbes estimated the cost at $400 million daily.
Germany paid in roubles and earlier this year estimated they would need until at least 2024 to become energy independent of Russia.
Gas supply contracts can be signed for a period such as 10 years and even countries at odds such as Russia and Ukraine respect such contracts. So, right now, Gazprom is getting gas through Ukraine even though the two countries are at war and the former is a state-owned enterprise.
The remaining Russian pipeline through Ukraine is currently pumping 42 million cubic meters of gas daily, which would come out to something like 14 billion annual capacity - about a quarter of what either of the Nord Streams could pump. Currently, Naftogaz is taking it to arbitration for alleged nonpayment of transit fees while Gazprom categorically denies such charges and is threatening to shut down the last pipeline to Europe aside from Turk Stream if Naftogaz proceeds with the complaint, which supplies southeast Europe at capacity of up to 31.5 billion cubic meters.
It seems Gazprom really might not have paid transit fees. This article is quoting Gazprom complaining that Naftogaz had no basis for suspending the Sokhranivka pipeline, which carried 1/3 of Russia gas transit to Ukraine so working backward from the stated capacity it seems Russia was moving around 100 million cubic meters of gas through Ukraine, for about 1 Turk Stream's equivalent of annual transit. Ukraine suspended that pipeline in May by declaring force majeure on account of interference from separatist and Russian force, but pledged to re-route the gas through other pipelines.
There seem to have been a suspicious number of suicides among people linked to Gazprom since the start of the conflict.
It would seem that long term gas contracts are made well in advance of their start date and be renewed up to at least a decade in advance. Here in a 2008 paper it can be seen that Russia already had multiple gas supply contracts for billions or 10s of billions of cubic meters of gas to several European countries, most of them to last until around 2030.
Link in previous point was before either Nord Stream was operational, and at the time it estimated that Russia exported 120 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Europe with 70% of that going through Ukraine. According to the BBC Nord Stream was said to supply 35% of the gas Europe imported from Russia. So given that it pumped nearly 60 billion cubic meters last year, that would make for around 170 bcm.
Earlier this year Russia halted shipments to Poland and Bulgaria along the Yamal-Europe pipeline because these countries did not comply with Russia's demand that all payments past April 1 be made in rubles.
So far I can't find a written source for this, but it appears that Gazprom refuses arbitration with Naftogaz regarding the Ukrainian pipelines because of "unfriendly jurisdiction" concerns.
I guess after the basic facts I might ask more interesting questions to find more information. Posting it for now as my laptop's running out of memory.
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