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Shrike


				

				

				
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joined 2023 December 20 23:39:44 UTC

				

User ID: 2807

Shrike


				
				
				

				
0 followers   follows 0 users   joined 2023 December 20 23:39:44 UTC

					

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User ID: 2807

If it helps: MKUltra was discovered via FOIA because the CIA missed a spot when cleaning up the crown jewels. Fairly easy IMHO to imagine a world in which it existed only in urban legend and conspiracy myth.

I think a couple hundred hardcore guys with combat experience and a clear vision are plenty enough people to topple a government under the right circumstances.

You can't be a Nazi and fight for a country run by a Jew.

I think that Real Life is often much more nuanced than this – people are often happy to team up with someone they hate to fight someone else they hate more, and military exigencies in particular makes for strange bedfellows. Random examples: the Free Arabian Legion, qualified Nazi "support" for (or at least limited facilitation of) early Zionism, support during the Civil War on the Confederate side for mass freeings of slaves to serve as soldiers.

I get the vague impression that a feature among far-right Ukrainian ethnonationalists is that the RUSSIANS are the inferior racial types, but that doesn't prevent them from thinking the same thing is true of Jews. Possibly e.g. Andriy Biletsky has moderated his views over time, but it seems quite possible to me he thinks fighting for a country run by a Jew is politically expedient for an anti-Jewish agenda over the long run. Of course I think one could, ah, question whether Ukrainian ethnonationalists are really "Nazis" even if they self-identify as Nazis for much the same reason and in the same sense that one could question if Lenin was really a Marxist/Communist.

I tend to agree with the commenters on here that corruption resulting in weapons getting trafficked is probably more likely than "a few hundred neo-Nazis topple the Ukrainian government" (although I doubt that's a problem unique to Azov) but in potentially unstable countries like, possibly, a future Ukraine I think there's a lot of potential for a few hundred guys with military experience and hardline political views to do Stuff up to and including Regime change. I'm not really sure that they need US weapons to do that, but of course it will look awkward if they end up using them.

the average male was historically much less likely to produce any offspring than the average female

Is this true specifically because of the age-old practice of "killing all the men and keeping all the women," though? My understanding is that that is at least one of the explanations for the genetic footprint we currently have today. Possibly the "80% of women reproduced but only 40% of men" says more about war than about love.

Sorry for the delay; I was out.

I have seen one video of Russia doing a bombing run with gravity bombs and zero videos of Ukraine doing so.

Both Ukraine and Russia are using glide bombs. If you poke around a bit, you can see videos of them both using unguided rockets in the CAS role.

I haven't even seen any complaints from Russia about anything but Storm Shadow.

Yes, and if Storm Shadow can penetrate layered Russian air defenses we ought to imagine LRASM can do the same. (Recall that a B-1 can carry 2-3 dozen LRASMs, so a squadron of them might literally be able to overwhelm a Chinese carrier battle group even if they launch and hit with every air-defense missile; the B-21 seems fairly small, maybe it carries 6ish?)

Single missile?

Perhaps I was too ambiguous; what I meant was it only takes a single missile to hit to render a ship non-combat effective. I agree that it will likely take salvos to hit reliably, although it is worth noting that it did not take large ones in the Falklands War, and that Ukraine appears to have sunk a Soviet cruiser (the Moskva) with a very small salvo of two subsonic missiles (if you trust the Ukrainian claims.) The Moskva had the S-300 – not exactly a slouch of an air-defense system – plus shorter-ranged anti-air missiles and CIWS. I can think of a lot of reasons why the Chinese ships might perform better than the Moskva but I think our priors ought to be that missile salvos will be effective, because they have been in the past and are now.

Anyway, if the LRASM (stealthy) or future hypersonic weapons give Chinese ships the same trouble that the Storm Shadow gave the Russian air-defense crews using similar missiles, I think the B-21 will be plenty scary.

(no heavy lift helicopter capability at all, extremely limited if nonexistent heliborne support capability) and helicopters don't have the range to reach Taiwan anyways.

Taiwan Strait is 100 miles. Combat radius of a Blackhawk is 370 miles. The Chinese medium-lift fleet (which includes the Super Frelon and Mi-8/Mi-17s) is should be adequate to get troops there.

IR sensors are absolutely fantastic, until, say, it rains. Very good to have, not reliable in the way radar is (radar has its own problems, of course).

Yes, the B-21 probably won't be able to do missions into actually contested airspace. The question is if it can get to within a couple hundred miles (LRASM; longer with in-development hypersonics) of the contested airspace and release its weapons. Stealth has never been absolute; the Russians and whoever have always been able to detect our B-2s and F-117s and F-22s, the question has always been about whether the stealth gives strike packages the extra edge they need to get within weapons-release range and get out.

The Russians have arguably the best integrated air-defense systems in the world (in Ukraine they scored a 90+ mile kill against a target flying <50 feet off the ground) and very impressive long-range air-to-air missiles fired from the world's fastest acknowledged aircraft with a radar antenna the size of a dinner table (100+ mile kill recorded) and the Ukrainians are still successfully running airstrikes against them using non-stealthy aircraft designed by the Soviets in the 1970s. I think the bomber will get through, the question is just if it's going to be effective. And unlike, say, a tank battalion, it only takes a single missile to render a ship combat ineffective. So I think the B-21 will probably be an effective weapon in the sense of being able to reach weapons release point (at least vs. China in a Taiwan scenario – albeit with some limitations) the real question in my mind is the relative effectiveness of US anti-ship missiles and Chinese anti-missile defenses.

(Source for Russian SAM/interceptor performance, see pages 20 - 21.)

The F-35 has a 750ish mile combat range, which can be extended by in-air refueling. You can tack another, say, 100 - 200 miles onto that with an anti-ship missile, so a carrier strike group could hang out midway between Guam and Taiwan and launch effective strike packages against targets in the Taiwan strait. And one thing that the war in Ukraine has proven is that stealthy cruise missiles launched by low-flying aircraft can evade layered air defense, so our assumption should be that this strategy is at least somewhat effective. Of course, the US can also sortie effective strike packages from CONUS, but they will take a lot longer to get to the target.

The "cheap drones" you mention the Chinese using will be Predator-style drones – quadcopter types won't have the range, you'll need large, long endurance surveillance assets – basically unmanned U-2s. Which means they show up very nicely on every radar within a couple hundred miles and a fighter will likely show up and dispatch you before you get within range of the carrier. Optics aren't necessarily particularly effective maritime search assets anyway, as you mention you really want long-range radar, but that's 1) expensive, 2) prone to being spoofed, and 3) lets everyone know you are out looking for a carrier well before you can actually find the carrier, if their electronics are working correctly. You can try to build a stealthy drone to mitigate these problems but at this point you're no longer a cheap drone, and probably not a cloud. And, well, see how well WWII-style search patterns worked out for the participants in WWII.

Now, I'm not saying that a carrier battle group couldn't be spotted in such a manner. I'm just saying it's not an easy win.

Something that might be is over-the-horizon radar. I'm not sure how effective that would be, or what limitations it might have.

The big advantage the US has re: space is that it can just put more space-based recon in space pretty quickly. At least, I assume that's what the X-37 is for. So quite possibly you could see a situation where China knocks down all our satellites and we just put up a maneuvering recon asset that they can't touch the next day.

I wouldn't be surprised if it's the US that makes the first move against satellites in a Pacific war: aircraft carrier battlegroups are actually pretty hard to locate if you don't have any imaging or radar satellites in orbit.

I agree that taking out the huge US satellite constellations will degrade US war fighting capabilities, but in a Pacific war over Taiwan I suspect a Kessler syndrome asymmetrically helps the United States: China is surrounded by Taiwan, South Korea and Japan in a ring, and their naval and shore-based assets will be able to track Chinese naval activity, identify it for targeting, and communicate that to US bomber strike packages originating from well outside China's effective reach. Meanwhile, the US carrier fleet will be free to steam in circles in the middle of nowhere, Pacific, and China will have to resort to trying to locate them with submarines, recon aircraft, and possibly ELINT (very fun and fancy until the carrier turns off its radios). It's possible there's some other options I haven't thought of, but the long and short of things is that targeting a ship at sea is much easier with orbital assets and much harder otherwise.

I also think it's worth considering that the US has a lot of nuclear-strike-warning orbital assets, so hitting US satellites indiscriminately may send the signal that you're planning to go ballistic in the nuclear way – but those same assets are helpful for all sorts of stuff, with resolutions sensitive enough to pinpoint the release of small weapons. I assume if you're China you just shoot them down anyway.

I should note that there are a lot of soft-kill ways to deal with satellites and (additionally) plenty of hard-kill ways that don't result in massive debris clouds. That doesn't mean people won't create said debris clouds – either because they're just using basic ASAT missiles or to make it harder for the US to simply putting more assets in orbit with its massive edge in earth-to-orbit transport.

I dunno about "12 months" but a couple things that I think point towards China's window closing, not opening:

  1. The US has started developing a lot of new anti-ship capabilities. But we're having embarrassing teething pains on the hypersonic weapons, and while we've got the stopgap LRASM in production it's unclear (at least to me) how many we've actually got ready to go into combat. A number of new programs, like the B-21 and the Australian acquisition of nuclear submarines, could potentially be very potent – but in 5 - 10 years, not months. If you're China, do you want to go to war today, or in 2035 when the US has 100 B-21s armed with hypersonic anti-ship missiles and Australia has its own set of nuclear submarines? (Obviously China won't be sitting still for the next decade, but if they think they have enough to go now, why wait for your enemy to get stronger?)
  2. Younger generations of Taiwanese are identifying more and more as Taiwanese rather than Chinese.

Since I suggested to @quiet_NaN that I would, here's my thoughts on the "surround Taiwan with the Coast Guard and start conducting customs inspections" option:

The good:

  • Since almost everyone recognizes PRC as the legitimate government of China, it puts China in a favorable position vs. USA + Japan in matters of international law and international reputation in a way that bombarding Taipei would not.
  • It also shifts the onus to act on Taiwan and/or Japan + USA, and puts them in the awkward position of potentially using military force against the Chinese Coast Guard.
  • It is easier to reverse than a war, and less embarrassing to cease operations than losing an invasion, but (importantly) it doesn't take an invasion off the table and might assist in preparing for one. It's a great trial balloon!
  • It lets the PRC cut off the Taiwanese supply of microprocessors and arms shipments destined for Taiwan, making their potential enemies weaker in one stroke.
  • A very soft version of it, such as simply enforcing existing Chinese customs law against traffic to and from Taiwan makes it something less than a blockade, but is still financially difficult for Taiwan (since it amounts to a double tax) and lets the Chinese restrict the flow of sensitive materials.
  • If Taiwan decides to comply, it acculturates Taiwan to Chinese rule.
  • The Taiwanese navy is defensively oriented and will be more vulnerable than it already is attempting to break a far blockade. If it does attempt to do so, China might be able to retaliate precisely by destroying those naval assets (or Taiwanese naval assets writ large) in "self-defense" without escalating the situation further. This gives puts China in a win-win scenario: Taiwan can acquiesce or it can risk losing its naval assets, rendering it more vulnerable to an invasion. Of course Taiwan could attempt to climb the escalation ladder, but doing so unilaterally would be risky.
  • International shipping is very risk-averse and would probably comply as a default.

The bad:

  • It is likely to precipitate dramatic Taiwanese reactions and harden the Taiwanese stance against China.
  • Parties attempting to break the blockade might be able to generate local force advantage and would probably get to pick their battles.
  • Although I think this risk would be mitigated somewhat if China mostly relied on its Coast Guard, it would invite a sort of reverse-Pearl Harbor wherein the US, Japan and Taiwan decided to secretly attack, and launched a coordinated strike on their own time against exposed Chinese naval assets. Being further from the mainland means being further from air cover and the mainland air defense umbrella, and in deeper water that is better for nuclear submarine operations. You can see a scenario where Team Taiwan lets the blockade go along for four or five months while getting every available nuclear submarine in position and then sinks a big chunk of the Chinese navy in half an hour.

Overall I wouldn't be surprised if China decided to do this in response to a US arms shipment, a la the Cuban missile crisis.

Is this true?

  1. My understanding is that Taiwan is not a nation independent from China; rather, they both claim to be be the legitimate government of China. As far as I know, nobody recognized Taiwan as a separate independent nation de jure. But to the extent that it is an act of war, it seems that (under the current legal theory) it would be an act of civil war. I'm not very familiar with international law, but I'm not aware of any legal principles banning a self-blockade.
  2. China is on the UN Security Council, so they presumably would veto any condemnation.

I support, broadly, Taiwanese independence and am not pro-PRC, but the legal situation here is novel and might be more conducive to China than people realize.

I think the blockade actually does a lot for China, and is arguably a good option. If I have some time maybe I'll write about that a more length.

An unfriendly nation on your borders is generally presumed to a clear threat to the safety of your citizens – this is the logic of NATO (and most other defensive alliances). Ukraine has also demonstrated its capability to harm Russian citizens inside Russia, so, yes – an unfriendly Ukraine constitutes a security threat to Russia.

Whether or not it's legitimate to INVADE a sovereign nation on your borders simply because it's unfriendly/a security threat is another question – but historically it's not unusual for nations to do it, regardless of the legitimacy. (Cuba and the United States comes to mind; see also the war between China and Vietnam.)

It seems to me like SpaceX is the stand-out success (reusable rockets are a big deal!) so there's a sort of natural gravitation towards it, perhaps particularly on here. But I think you raise a good point! In the spirit of answering your questions, here's my somewhat reflexive thoughts on the other stuff:

  • Tesla: OP criticizes them for hype (which seems fair) but from what I can tell on a two-second Google they do seem to make money, billions of dollars worth. And my recollection is that they beat the rest of the US automakers in electric cars and still outperform them in other areas. I'd consider leading a company to that sort of success (or really any success!) a W under about any circumstances (even though I think it's perfectly fair to point out how it is rewarded by subsidies.) However, I'm...skeptical about some of the issues with the cars (which may not be unique to Teslas) and I am not sure if the engineering is particularly good – China's got a huge EV market, perhaps in the future they eat his lunch. I'm not especially optimistic about self-driving, at least in the medium term, but that's partially because I think there's strong inertial force against it, and fixing the engineering problems doesn't entail fixing the regulatory and repetitional problems.
  • The Boring Company: seems really cool, but also like they missed their moment. Just doesn't seem to be enough demand. Maybe their time will come, but it doesn't seem like it has yet.
  • Twitter: renaming it was a bad idea (imho). Firing most of the staff and generally decreasing the draconian attitude was a good idea. I'm very interested to see if he can make the finances work. (In his defense, my understanding was that "getting the finances to work" was something Twitter struggled with before Elon took over.) I actually think the basic plan (strip down the staffing costs, print money on the world's most high-velocity social media platform) was good – obviously some of the advertising income streams hit snafus. I will say that although I'm a fan of the ad-revenue-sharing deal in theory, in practice it does seem somewhat scammy to me. I'm not saying that rises to the level of an actual scam but I can definitely imagine a lot of people misunderstanding which end of the distribution they are on.

So, overall, based on my assessment, I'd say SpaceX is a huge W, Tesla a solid W so far, Boring company hasn't had it moment yet and may never, and Twitter probably a good thing on balance but the jury's still out on the end results for Musk.

I have a question - if Falcon Heavy is so much cheaper than Falcon 9, why are they relying so much on the latter for Starlink?

I dunno, but I can speculate – it might be that they have lots on hand. Also, it's good to stress-test reusable tech like Falcon 9 as much as possible to discover potential failures, and less costly to discover them with a smaller rocket.

Can we do some back of the envelope calculations here? How low does the price have to go, for people to start launching satellites en-masse? How many would they want to launch? How many clients would SpaceX have to get to make a decent profit at such a low price point? How much can they launch before triggering Kessler Syndrome?

I'd say we are already launching satellites en-masse. You'll note that Falcon Nine started launching in 2010 and started reusing its boosters regularly around 2018; the steep US vertical ascent starts in 2020. You can also compare to CubeSat launches by year (which is not omnidirectional, but broke 100/200/300 in 2014/2017/2021. Since (AFAIK) the low price point has a profit baked-in, I assume as long as they have demand they are profiting at that rate.

Kessler Syndrome happens on accident, of course. Orbit, especially outside of LEO, is really big, and satellites are teensy-tinsy and decay in orbit. So the answer is "tens of thousands" but also that you do have more risk of Kessler Syndrome as you get more up there. However, even if we reach a point where we say "no more satellites" we'll still need to put more up as the old ones decay. Presumably we'll need lots of rocket launches for whatever space exploration we're doing, and possibly (as discussed) for tasks like asteroid mining or even decommissioning old satellites so that Kessler Syndrome is less of a worry.

Obviously, Musk and his sort want to go to Mars and the rest of the solar system. If you're doing that the demand for mass is much more than could be accommodated by satellites (I would imagine), at least until you get onsite resource production up and running.

I don't particularly think Starship development is going poorly. Falcon 9 had a number of failures on early launch tests. Both of its first two launches failed in the recovery phase, and of the first seven, four had some form of a failure. Yet, as I think we've shown, it's matured into a tremendously successful launch vehicle. Musk's whole "move fast and break things" shtick, as I understand it, is built around accepting more risk up front in exchange for faster results. Starship has had three launches so far, with what appears to my untrained eye to be progressive improvement. Unless the costs of these failures are high enough to cause SpaceX to run out of funding (which I doubt – they're made out of stainless steel!) my presumption is that they will simply move past the failures, as they did with Falcon 9. Now, I wouldn't say it's impossible that Starship is found to be unworkable, or retired for other reasons. I just know that accepting and moving past failure is something SpaceX has historically done (and is normal in aerospace development) so without specific reasons to think otherwise I sort of assume that that will be the case here – although I can certainly imagine a number of reasons it might not be.

orbital delivery would already be absolutely revolutionized

It is!

There aren't that many people who want to launch satellites, or do that many things in space.

I think quite the opposite – if you get the cost low enough, sending stuff to space becomes a high school science project and everyone wants to do it. Lots of amateur CubeSats in this vein.

I think he'll run out of hype before he manages to get it to work.

Maybe you're right. To clarify, your position is that Starship will never make a successful orbital payload delivery? Or that it will never land successfully?

Sure... but the glowies can pay Bezos instead.

Right now they can't, can they? New Glenn is having its own developmental issues, leaving the only functional Blue Origin delivery vehicle New Shepard, which is designed for orbital tourism, not payload delivery.

Can he please deliver on any of the other wild insanely valuable things he promised

Am I missing something here, or wasn't SpaceX the company that provided, under (substantially although IIRC not entirely) Musk's leadership, reusable rockets? That's a huge deal in terms of proven track record – basically SpaceX did something that the massive defense corporations failed to do for decades.

If Starship works (and it seems likely to) it will absolutely revolutionize orbital delivery. Going back to the idea of using Starlink to create demand, Starship is likely to drop cost-to-orbit enough to create more demand. (I don't think "Starship will work eventually" should be considered an Elon Fanboy Position, it's fundamentally a bigger rocket of the type we already know works! But this is rocket science, and I'm not a rocket scientist, so take that with a grain of terrestrial salt.)

Now, I wouldn't be surprised to see space mining in my lifetime (we know it is technically feasible) but I think the true reason SpaceX will do fine for the short-to-medium future is because space is a key national security concern, and getting moreso. There is a ton of money in national security, and SpaceX is uniquely suited to tap it.

I like the comparison of the spotting plane to the drone. One thing that exists in this war that didn't in World War One is the possibility of deep strike (cruise missiles, ballistic missiles) which means that massed assaults (cut down in WW1 by machine-guns and tube artillery) can be defeated before even reaching the lines.

On the topic of good sources, in my very limited experience, I'd recommend the Royal United Services Institute, they actually sent some guys over to Ukraine to talk to the Ukrainians. RAND probably remains one of the best places to read the rough draft of history before it happens.

I don't read this stuff religiously, but I've found what I have read on the Russo-Ukraine War (something like one paper from each source!) to be interesting.

Not "swimming in space" – that just requires changing your shape.

There are "warp drives" that use exotic matter for superluminal travel, but there is also at least one proposal that uses no exotic matter, albeit only for slower-than-light travel.

My understanding is that propellantless drives ("swimming in space") are permitted by the current Laws Of Physics. This approach is very different from the one taken by the propellantless propulsion efforts, though.

Yes, I used that word in explaining what I meant. :)

By "war of annihilation" I (perhaps unclearly) meant "destroying all their hardware and killing all their personnel to reduce their ability to fight" not "killing all their civilians."

I'm not an Atlanticist or a Putinist BUT I have played Paradox games, which gives me an intimate understanding of Putin's motivations and goals.

The endgame is to peel off those sections of Ukraine that Russia thinks are valuable/pro-Russian, and to neutralize what's left of Ukraine, rendering them a permanent non-threat and pliable diplomatically and economically. Russia appears to be (currently) attempting to reach this goal by conducting a war of annihilation, attriting Ukraine's combat personnel and equipment until it either accepts Russia's terms or is unable to resist Russia's de facto imposition of them.

Russia's war against Finland is a good historical example to look towards.

I believe there are back-breeding projects, or you can compare cows from more "primitive" (wild) conditions, such as longhorns, with other cattle. In my experience longhorns come across as considerably more intelligent and resilient than shorthorn cattle, although I have little experience with the latter.

The Obama administration's decision to let the states do an end-run around federal drug laws that marked one of the biggest swings in favor of state power away from federal power seems like a very important but under-examined swing from state power to federal power, a huge erosion of the federal power norm.

Louisiana controls the Mississippi river chokepoint, which is pretty strategic. Just as an exercise in good geopolitics it would be smart to secure it if you could, I think.

Similar deal with Florida (gives you much more control over the Gulf). I think you'd also (with TX + FL) scoop most of the US' space launch infrastructure (although Vandenberg is in California) and that could pay off considerably down the road.

Security benefits can be a bit hard to quantify at times, so whether or not that would "pay off" or not, I don't know. Given some sort of national breakup, from Texas' POV it seems like the smart thing to do might be to pursue a security/diplomatic alliance with other states that secede without committing to financial support, which would increase mutual safety without dragging Texas down in a negative financial spiral.

I have a theory that if some states broke off from the US of A without a wholesale US collapse, it might cause some very interesting fiscal effects that would bolster the long-run standing of the breakaway states, but I think in the short term even with a mutually amicable separation it would cause a considerable financial shakeup in the best-case scenario.