I also imagine a lot of people think (sometimes correctly!) that they can sit down with their daughter/son and steer them through the rocks. "Hey look, people will tell you this and that, or pressure you to do X and Y you should do this and that and if you do Y but not X you'll be fine." And probably a fair share of "your mom and I fooled around before we got re/married and look at us, we're doing ~fine" – even if it's not said aloud. (I care a lot about no premarital sex but I think at a society-wide level even paying no premarital sex lip service and winking a bit at it in practice does a lot of useful work in making people think twice.)
Of course, an open question (to many, anyway) is how many of their parents have college degrees. Wouldn't be super surprised if a fair share of dads were never in a frat because they are sitting on half a million dollars they made doing lawn care or HVAC contracting or something that doesn't require a college degree since they graduated high school.
Broadly agree, but it is worth noting that as far as I can tell past drug experimentation is not a hard bar to entering the police force, and being convicted of crimes is not a guaranteed bar to continuing to serve on a police force.
The odds of this are astronomically low
They might be, for you, depending on where you live, but I suspect they aren't as low as you think. I come from a background much the same as you, but I had a family member get cited for hunting with an illegal shotgun. Game warden jumped the fence onto private property to inspect the firearm (a search with no warrant or probable cause, which ordinarily would be extremely unlawful but game wardens get special dispensation to violate normal Constitutional precepts.) Did my family member have a blocker installed in the tube (the typical way of ensuring compliance)? Yes. Was he hunting with more shells than legally allowed? No. Was the warden able to force an extra shell in because the blocker was slightly too short? Yes.
The amount of "trouble" the warden had to go through to issue a ticket for ~no reason was considerable (and frankly I think he put himself in actual physical danger by jumping people's fences like that, you don't know what's on the other side) but cops and prosecutors are incentivized to "catch" people. Expanding the circle a bit wider to issues I have much less knowledge about, I had a classmate at college whose friend went to prison for rape. Girl later copped to lying about it. Did my classmate's friend get out of prison? Nope (and as far as I know there were no legal consequences for the accuser, either, but I didn't keep up with the story).
Is this all anecdata? Sure. I could pull up real data, but I think you'd claim that it was poisoned by specious anti-cop organizations. And I might not even disagree with you on that. I've even had fairly good experiences with law enforcement types, and I'm not about to go on an unhinged anti-cop rant. I just don't think police and prosecutors are really different from anyone else.
my rejection of slippery slope arguments about harsh justice
Well, I'm not arguing against harsh justice. I'm fine with executing murderers. I'd be okay if we executed more people (a lot more people). If we can be confident that the right people have been caught for the right crimes, I have no problem with harsh justice. If you want to argue that a single bad prosecutor shouldn't automatically result in release of a prisoner, that's fine – and my understanding is that it doesn't; retrials exist for a reason – but I suspect pragmatically the reason accused criminals so often walk due to prosecutorial misconduct is that past prosecutorial misconduct is an excellent way to introduce doubt in the mind of the jury on retrial. (Perhaps some actual lawyers here can weigh in.)
I do trust the justice system to keep the welfare of normal law-abiding people in mind, and to appreciate the natural disincentives against corruption and malice built into the psyche of conscientious and intelligent individuals.
I don't think that police officers – whose reporting is what prosecutors and judges rely on – are particularly conscientious or intelligent – probably on average less intelligent than college graduates. In my personal experiences speaking to people in the military and law enforcement (and related careers, such as firefighting) I get the impression or "vibe" that what you might call petty corruption is fairly commonplace. Prosecutors I would guess are probably more intelligent than police officers (law school filter) but that does not make them any less corrupt than other intelligent individuals (see the long catalogue of PhDs who keep getting busted for outright fraud despite every reason not to commit outright fraud.)
My point here isn't that cops and prosecutors are bad people. They're probably slightly better than average levels of badness. But they're people people and you can't just trust to their natural disincentives against corruption and malice.
my politics can seize it
I don't think that's how these sorts of things work. Whose politics is in control of the FBI? No, the answer isn't "woke," the answer is "the FBI." Whose politics is in control of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department? The answer isn't "woke," the answer (apparently) is "literal organized criminal gangs."
What I think people often fail to consider is that all power structures develop their own interests and they pursue them independent of what the people nominally in charge of them believe. And it is in the best interest of society to properly align prosecutors (and cops) to exercise basic competence, to actually catch the right people, and to avoid imprisoning innocent ones.
In part because (in the US, anyway) we prioritize innocent men going free over guilty men going to jail. Sufficiently advanced incompetence is indistinguishable from malice; sufficiently advanced malice is indistinguishable from incompetence; if a prosecutor does something sufficiently malicious or incompetent like "refusing to disclose exculpatory evidence" it creates a credible concern the accused is innocent and the prosecutor is framing him. The "what if I" question can be flipped on its head: what if you or a loved one was railroaded by the state? Obviously a single murderer going free on a technicality is bad, but a bad prosecutor prosecuting the wrong person is worse, since it casts the entire legal system into question (bad for society) and lets a single murderer go free (bad for justice and society) and potentially puts the wrong person in prison (bad for that person, at a minimum).
Now, I'm not a pro-releasing-murderers-to-kill-again guy. Obviously the goal here should be competent prosecution that
- doesn't prosecute innocent people
- does successfully prosecute guilty people
But I think there's a good reason for tossing (or, perhaps less problematically, retrying) cases if the prosecution is bad enough. ETA: I also sometimes suspect that bad prosecutors get off too easily by just having their cases tossed, so perhaps there's room to improve the status quo by creating additional negative incentives for prosecutorial misconduct.
I'm about 99% certain this robot is just a very expensive and fancy remote-controlled car. I don't think this incident has any bearing at all on AI, since no AI was involved.
However, on that note, I doubt there will be tens of millions of robots walking around anytime soon, even if (especially if) they are smarter than people...because if they are smarter than humans it will be much, much cheaper and more profitable just to connect them to the internet and have them do email and managerial jobs.
Nah, I don't believe that either side was that smart.
On the one hand, I'm inclined to believe you! Everyone overestimates government competence.
On the other hand, here's some excerpts from a 2019 RAND report:
Eastern Ukraine is already a significant drain on Russian resources, exacerbated by the accompanying Western sanctions. Increasing U.S. military aid would certainly drive up the Russian costs, but doing so could also increase the loss of Ukrainian lives and territory or result in a disadvantageous peace settlement. This would generally be seen as a serious setback for U.S. policy.
The option of expanding U.S. military aid to Ukraine has to be evaluated principally on whether doing so could help end the conflict in the Donbass on acceptable terms rather than simply on costs it imposes on Moscow. Boosting U.S. aid as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to advance a settlement might well make sense, but calibrating the level of assistance to produce the desired effect while avoiding a damaging counter-escalation would be challenging.
Obviously RAND hedges their bets here, and I don't mean to claim that they were clairvoyant, or anything. But while Western analysts underestimated Ukrainian resolve, RAND was able to correctly point out the very serious downsides to sending Ukraine more weapons well before the escalation of the conflict. And then...we sent them more weapons...and the war escalated exactly as RAND predicted it could.
Now, supposing that you are a member of the US diplomatic-security apparatus that is concerned about Russian strength (and, let's say, sharing the common belief that Ukraine will not stand up to Russian might), but also nursing the unspoken (but very defensible) belief that a united Europe with an independent foreign policy is more of a threat to the United States over the long term than Russia will ever be. Just going off of this report, all of the things that RAND outlines as "risks" might look to you like "benefits," since you suspect that Russia invading and annexing more of Ukraine will "spook" Europe and increase diplomatic pressure on Germany to stop placing nice with Russia. Now increasing military aid looks like a win-win: you either weaken Russia or you spook Europe and with any luck you manage to thread the needle and do both by making the Russians look boorish and violent without them actually committing. And, as a strategist, an option where the worst plausible scenario has hidden benefits is a good option.
Things, in this postulation, DON'T go to plan: you're not omni-competent, the needle isn't threaded, Putin actually invades instead of just suffering from the weapons you've been shipping to Ukraine. How do you spin that situation?
I think what we've seen out of DC is consonant with that – pressuring Europe to give away their arsenal to Ukraine and buy American-made weapons systems instead.
Now, to your point, I don't even know that it requires the level of conscious thought I've put into it, just a sort of self-advantage-maximalizing sensibility, to get the most for the least. Maybe there's no grand strategy, just a sort of shrewd subconscious impulse. But I do find it very interesting that the "US diplomatic and military failure" DOES seem to have turned out in a way to have maximized US leverage over Europe and weakened them considerably. We replaced reliance on Russia for natural gas with reliance on the United States. We persuaded our NATO allies to give away, what, 500 tanks (many in service) while we have a few thousand Abrams in storage, of which we sent...1% (31). (Incidentally, I believe the reason given for not using more Abrams was that the logistics tail was too long. And while I do believe the logistics tail would be long, if we take this at face value it seems to suggest that we wouldn't be able to support Abrams in Europe during a conflict with Russia, which seems...problematic if true!)
So while I'm very uncertain as to how much of what has developed was planned, and I definitely agree that neither side was smart enough to correctly foresee the exact twists and turns of all these events, the extent to which it's undercut Europe to the benefit of the US is worth asking questions about, I think, but I rarely see it discussed.
Ukraine was an embarrassingly easy target...Every other country that Russia wants to fuck with is much more dangerous than Ukraine.
Pre-war, I assumed this would be true because of the EXTREMELY mediocre showing of Ukraine during the Russian invasion of Crimea. But (pretty obviously) the Ukrainians did a lot of work between then and the second Russian invasion.
And if you set aside the question of Ukrainian morale, I don't think they are an embarrassingly easy target at all, on paper. They had a very large inherited ground army, and a large population pool. They're more on the level of Poland, not a softer target (say) Estonia or Latvia or even a medium-hard target like Finland. It's true from what I can tell that their weapon modernization was fairly meh and that their air force in particular was probably lackluster (but see also Poland, which is still flying Su-17s!) but the fundamentals (lots of tanks, artillery, warm bodies) go a long way with proper morale. I think that, e.g. non-US NATO would have struggled to invade Ukraine the same way Russia did.
Tangent, but – it's not merely a question of production; the war has also revealed that Russian technology is able to adequately counter ours (usually, it seems, after an adjustment period). For instance, the Russians shot down our in-service anti-radiation missiles! That was perhaps predictable before the war, but I still think it's a BIG DEAL because US/NATO air superiority doctrine is premised around being able to destroy enemy SAM launchers with (among other weapons) anti-radiation missiles, and the Ruskies just...shot them down with the air defenses they were supposed to be targeting. And that's just one example of their ability to adopt to our drip-feeding them our most modern (surface) weapons systems at an inoculatory rate.
This really gets my goat since in a real no-holds-barred war with NATO where the first two weeks might be determinate, if it takes the Russians two weeks to adjust to our tactics, their ability to adjust eventually is no big deal. But if we give them that month to adjust now, they'll be better prepared if there's ACTUALLY a confrontation with NATO. And presumably so will Iran and China. (The one upside is that this knife cuts both ways; the West has a much better picture of Russian capabilities now.)
We need to see the reality and adapt- either cut a deal that gifts Russia the donbass region, or massively increase the amount of aid going to Ukraine, and restructure the current arms industry to be suited for a serious war.
If you see the war as a way to manipulate NATO countries to US interests by ensuring they are weak and dependent on US military aid so that they do not develop their own, independent military and the foreign policy that is downstream from that, 'we' (the US) absolutely don't need to do either of these things. Letting Ukraine bleed dry and letting Putin station a massive, battle-hardened army rebuilt with modern technology on the Polish border is, from a certain point of view, a massive win for US foreign policy.
Whether or not that's actually the US goal here I obviously can't say but I can't help but notice that everything 'we' (the US) has done seems to be nudging things in that direction.
I think economics are part of it, but I really don't think raising a kid is as expensive as people think. Like the Korean test prep mentioned in the threat, the things that seem expensive are things besides the actual raising of the kid (e.g. swim lessons, private school, tutoring...)
But just "having a child and raising them to adulthood" is not that expensive from what I can tell.
If this is correct (and I am sure the real picture is at least slightly more complicated) than low fertility becoming an elite concern will likely boost the status of having children.
I think part of the reason for a lack of children in the Western world was the media emphasis on Malthusian thinking and the difficulties of having children. If the elites double back it seems likely that fertility will also double back, although I doubt it will rise to the same degree.
I need to finish Vinland Saga. I really liked The Norseman in part because I think that film was quite happy to more-or-less inhabit the ideas of the people portrayed in the film, instead of the ideas of modern audiences.
This is an underappreciated point, which is that the more people are connected to The Internet, the more The Internet will organically tilt Chinese (and Asian more generally). This is true of other markets, too; we're able to see the impact of Chinese preferences on Hollywood, for instance.
For the record, about a third of Americans own guns, although I would estimate the number would be slightly higher since a nonzero amount of people will lie to people who call them on the phone asking if they own a boomstick. 44% report living in a household with a gun, which is functionally closer to a useful number (as if a wife can't or won't use her husband's revolver). I wouldn't be surprise if the "true" numbers were closer to 40% and 50% respectively.
They've been reversed by using the other three boxes, which is...vastly preferable.
Not to mention that it turns out that the PREMIER weapon in modern warfare (for cost-effectiveness, anyway) is not tanks, fighter aircraft, or cruise missiles, but a $25 Chinese Amazon drone with a $2 explosive warhead.
I actually think that bulwark-against-tyranny types often underestimate the difficulty of a successful low-intensity conflict. But imagine a Northern Ireland-type conflict today, except the IRA has the DJ Mavik.
This is a bad and inaccurate model for how successful revolts happen. The American Revolution was led by dissatisfied elites who were living at the pointy end of life satisfaction at the time and risked it all for reasons that were partially ideological.
Desperate people foster low-level street violence that is typically easily crushed. Dissatisfied elites are the true threats to regimes, and they don't revolt out of desperation. There's a reason that every few years people discover that DHS or someone has been flagging disgruntled O6s as threats to homeland stability, and it's not because they're stupid.
The government can force you into military service if they want, and always has been able to, at least in the United States.
But yes, as IGI-111 says, a strong militia at the state level provides a very potent counterbalance to the capabilities of the federal government. Also, when every single person is either in the military or has military training, it may make your armed forces less reliable for the purposes of tyranny (since you'll have a harder time selecting for loyalists) and it makes the citizenry you'll be looking to oppress considerably more resilient. Interestingly, up to and during the Civil War, the army was actually a very localist organization. Regiments were raised from a certain geographic area, and they selected their own officers democratically – a far cry from the centralized command and control mechanisms that we all assume to be the default today.
But besides this, the reason I floated it is that it actually could be (I think, maybe) a decent mechanism for weeding out legitimately dangerous characters; a dishonorable discharge is the equivalent of a felony and bars people from firearm possession. Maybe, since we're making up stuff in the abstract (Goodguy still being in favor of the Second Amendment in practice) a simple "can you serve your country and community responsibly for a year without committing a felonious offense?" test is a good way of preemptively weeding out the people Goodguy is talking about.
(I'm very much on the fence about this and expect to get at least one comment from someone who served that actually no the psychopaths do fine in military service and then they use their experience to go tip over banks in Chicago or something. But I'd rather be conscripted for a year and then have a free pass to buy whatever gun I used in the service than live under a British shotguns-only permitting regime.)
But I think this comment is a good time to point out something sort of interesting at the heart of American freedom. Today, "freedom" is typically defined as "lack of government coercion" but the American experiment assumed lots of government coercion as part of what made freedom possible. Things like jury service, militia service, and the draft were contemplated and accepted by America's framers as something that would strengthen American freedom. A lot of this was about checks-and-balances, but I think it's worth considering the sort of person they thought such civic participation would make.
Gun ownership is like car ownership: the more you use them, the more exposure to risk you accept, but the more proficient you get at them, the more you lower your risk while using them. (Driving a car for only an hour a year is actually a bad idea!) Today there's so many truisms about "law abiding gun owners" that I think they often obscure the interesting suggestion at the heart of them, which is that unlawful firearms violence is inversely correlated to actual use of firearms. My guess is that people who own firearms to hunt, or as a hobby, get more range time than most murderers.
I don't think that using a firearm makes you a more moral person. But I do think that being part of a culture that teaches you to exercise self-governance (both at the personal level and at the civic level) is more likely to make you into a person who is law abiding and responsible. I wouldn't say we've entirely lost that culture in America, and I'm not confident the schemes people scrape together (mandatory militia service! gun permits! regulation! deregulation!) will be able to return the parts of that culture that have eroded away. But that's the America I want to (and largely do) live in, an America where I can trust my neighbors to vote wisely, serve as just jurors, handle firearms and automobiles with the respect they deserve, and ask if I mind before lighting up a cigarette.
Well, one big difference is that cigarettes only play a very minor role in hurting anyone other than the people who use them, as opposed to guns.
I challenge you to rethink this framing, both because secondhand smoking is a thing (estimated cost on a Google: upwards of 40K lives per year; somewhere around 3x the total number of gun murders) and because (IIRC) most gun violence victims in the US either shot themselves or (less likely but still statistically significant) were part of an ongoing criminal enterprise. People getting shot and killed in e.g. a random mugging or a school shooting is far from the median case of death by firearm.
Maybe there is a way to keep whatever deterring-the-government force that the 2nd Amendment has without also making it so easy for apolitical, anti-social psychopaths to get guns?
Yes, mandatory military/militia service.
As for the NSA, I am not convinced that it does much that is good to curtail violent crime in the US.
Yes, because we don't ask it to. Probably it could if so directed.
But I believe that broadly free speech is essential to the kind of society that I would want to live in
This is how many people feel about guns.
widespread public gun ownership did nothing to stop NSA domestic surveillance I also see how the Republicans' pro-2nd Amendment position has contributed to the problem [of violent crime]
Well, if the goal is to get rid of or dramatically curtail violent crime, NSA domestic surveillance is Good, Actually. Having the government spy on my data all of the time is an "invasion of privacy" which hurts me only in a dignitary way, except inasmuch as it can be used to construct a domestic surveillance state in the service of a totalitarian regime. But, since the 4th Amendment hasn't stopped said domestic surveillance either, from your position why shouldn't we bite the bullet the rest of the way and go full panopticon?
The answer of course is that freedom isn't a bright-line binary switch [unless you live in a place with actual chattel slavery], it's a back-and-forth, and just because you're on the backfoot for a decade or two doesn't mean you should throw in the towel and embrace the comparative advantages of TOTALITARIANISM. And in the same way that the 4th Amendment is an (imperfect) protector of American's rights, the 2nd Amendment is also an (imperfect) protector of American's rights. Certainly it has protected American's rights to keep and bear arms!
You act as if this right is purely instrumental, but it is not. The 2nd Amendment is good because it does serve as a bulwark against tyranny, and just because the bulwark isn't perfect doesn't mean we shouldn't get rid of it (imagine if we got rid of checks and balances because they demonstrably fail from time to time!) But it's also good because shooting is fun and a good thing for people to do, and it's the sort of good and fun thing that people want to take away, and it's good that there's a rule saying you can't do that. You can see something similar with the 1st Amendment: it's not merely instrumental, with free speech as a bulwark against "tyranny" – free speech is something that is good to exercise.
The problems, in terms of risk to human life and wellbeing, caused by alcohol, tobacco, and drugs are vastly worse than the problems caused by guns in the United States, and they are probably worse contributors to the violent crime problem, but you rarely see anyone endorse banning the former and a great many people are convinced that banning the latter causes or contributes to a lot of modern ills (including, ironically, violent crime.) If we're going to violate people's rights to achieve Good Ends (we swear for real this time!) then I think the cost/benefit calculus is significantly higher there. But, curiously, there seems to be much more demand for taking people's guns than cigarettes (even though about three times as many Americans own guns.) I think one can conclude from this that the desire to take guns has more to do (on balance, perhaps not in every individual case, including yours) from a dislike of guns than it does a Principled Stance on government action that (ostensibly) is for people's own benefit.
I agree that it was a war of choice, but I think they had ~somewhat deluded themselves into thinking that Lincoln's election sealed the deal against them. I think this was an exaggeration in the short term, but probably they were correct in the long term: the hostility to slavery was real, even if many people were apathetic about it, and the power of slaveholding states was being curtailed, and geopolitical factors were tilting against the South electorally. Basically, they were inching closer to being permanently locked out of political power as a region, I think.
The South thought they would win because they thought they had superior martial prowess, and because they were fighting a defensive war and believed their situation was analogous to that of the colonies during the American Revolution. They were at least partially correct (they were better at fighting) but the North had more manpower and was able to import vast amounts of additional manpower over the course of the war as well. But they also had convinced themselves, I think, that the struggle was existential. They were willing to fight to preserve their way of life, which I suppose in some ways was easier than changing their way of life, even if the latter was more moral and would have been more beneficial in the long run than losing a war.
Or alternatively everyone in North America might have grown to see the "peculiar institution" as a defining trait that set them off from the Brits and when the British moved to crackdown on slavery in the 1800s the combined North American colonies might have steamrolled them with superior Yankee industry and Southern military leadership, resulting in a hundred more years of chattel slavery across the entire Anglosphere!
I find your hypothetical more reasonable than mine. But something one doesn't understand until one reads letters from the time period is how much Northern will to fight the South was motivated by (checks notes) antipathy towards Europe, not slavery per se. (On average I'd say Northerners didn't like slavery but they didn't like black people either.) The Northerners saw the Southerners as oligarchs after the European feudal model, and that was a large part of what they had a problem with. Splitting the Union was unacceptable to them because it meant that the grand Republican experiment had "failed" (read: made them look bad to the Europeans.) Or at least that's what I recall being struck by when I did some primary source readings. Perhaps my memory and/or coursework was selective.
That's not to say that there weren't a very vocal and dedicated group that saw slavery itself as unacceptable and campaigned specifically to get rid of it, even at the cost of war. But (and this is my point) culture works in funny ways and in an alternative history where the Revolution never happened over self-government+taxes it might have happened later over "self-government+slavery." Never underestimate how crotchety people will get over being told what to do.
Just as a technical note, the South wanted the UK to intervene badly, but I don't think that was their best or only chance of winning, and they actively pursued strategies to unilaterally break the blockade themselves. Ultimately I think they lost because they got bled white, not because they were blockaded. Southern casualties were extraordinarily high as a percentage of the population compared to any other American war, and although they had trouble with heavy industry (you know, cannons) they were able to produce basic necessities like gunpowder to the end. In fact, IIRC, their soldiers were better off for powder than they were for food.
The Ukrainians had been launching strikes into the region for some time, which means that any troops being built up for an attack were probably still well behind the lines if this theory is correct (I dunno if it is, not being privy to Ukrainian high command's thinking.) If you were to launch such an attack, you'd want to time it before any troops were placed on the border but after as many minefields and roads were cleared as possible.
There have been some open-source reporting suggesting that there might be a Russian attack from this position, although Russian activity in the area seems to have dropped off before the attack. Ukrainians were saying in July that they expected an attack from the North, and the Russians did in fact launch a raid later that month.
A Russian buildup in the Kursk region was reported earlier this spring, although it was subsequently reported that Russian activity in the Sumy area decreased.
The best explanation/defense of Ukraine's actions that I saw actually came from a guy I consider fairly pro-Russian (Michael Valtersson, a Swede), who said they were expecting a Russian attack from that axis and attacked preemptively. He said the Russians had begun removing minefields in preparation of the troop incursion and that the Ukrainians infiltrated in sabotage groups and then probably attacked during a routine troop rotation (so they were able to double their numbers for the offensive without it raising alarm bells.)
A preemptive attack at a weak spot seems like, on balance, a good move to me. Throws the enemy off balance, forces them to throw their forces into retaking ground they have lost instead of taking more ground.
Absolutely true, but imho they ought to be prepared for something more sophisticated than that. (It's been reported, for instance, that Iran is interested in retaliating against Trump for bombing Soleimani.)
While I don't think you're wrong wrong about this, at least not in terms of popular perception, the shift of UFOs from the tangible to the esoteric began during the Cold War. The Raelians were founded in the 70s (and apparently the first "UFO religion" in the 1950s.) I think the dynamic you're describing is more that it took a few decades for pop culture to catch up to the "cutting edge" of "UFO research" (however you want to define it.)
From what I can tell, it's extremely common for people who start out on the tangible nuts-and-bolts angle to go very quickly down the esoteric pipeline (see Vallee and even Hynek!) But as Spielberg explained to Vallee while making Close Encounters of the Third Kind, that's harder to explain to an audience. (Of course then he caved in the fourth Indiana Jones movie.)
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