Do you not think it likely/plausible that Trump would force Russia to accept a freezing of the conflict along current lines with no additional conditions by way of threats? Between the circumstance that any Republican administration is likely to contain more hawks/military optimists, a general preference his team seems to have for bold moves and a certain "Nixon going to China" effect now that in the public perception the Democrats are the party owning the "help Ukraine" brand, I think he could make the threat of escalation credible - say, to start, by providing Ukraine with significantly more and better deep strike equipment, letting them base combat aviation in adjacent European countries, greenlighting an incursion into Transnistria, or even going through with garrisoning some Western troops in the rear to free up Ukrainian troops for the front. It's not clear what responses would even be available to Russia to any of those that I can see Putin risking, apart from maybe shooting down some US surveillance drones over the Black Sea.
(Ukraine, I imagine, could be strongarmed to accept freezing with no additional conditions; their current public refusal is just for morale reasons.)
Since everything is looking like a Trump win now, what are your actual predictions for the trajectory of the Ukraine war?
As far as I'm concerned, the doomsaying consensus predicting something like an end to supplies, forced armistice followed by Russia rearming to strike later with accumulated force struck me as unfounded and downright strange. If we even accept the premise that Trump would in fact cut supplies and force a truce, it's not at all clear to me that this would be to Ukraine's disadvantage. If anything, UA currently seems to be the side that would greatly benefit from a pause, as they could actually train up their masses of conscripts (probably to a higher standard than is available to Russia, judging by performance of "elite" Ukrainian vs. "elite" Russian troops) rather than burning them as fast as they can be equipped and give their backers time to actually ramp up production of crucial high-tech equipment such as air defense platforms, where it's clear that in the limit the West's ability to produce would outstrip Russia's ability to attrite but they just happen to be stuck on the back foot. Meanwhile, it's not clear how well Russia's losses and departures and weird 8D economic sprezzatura would even hold up under a sudden few months of deafening silence if the guns were to rest, and they don't really have all that much slack left to ramp production up further.
Conditional on Trump forcing a truce, my modal scenario is actually that in a year's time a stronger Ukraine steamrolls a weaker Russia, while conditional on everything continuing as before I would now expect Ukraine losing more and more until its will to fight is broken and it feels compelled to sign a much less advantageous treaty of its own accord. Why is the former scenario not even being treated as a possibility by respectable publications? Is it just that they all tried to convert some pro-Ukraine goodwill into anti-Trump sentiment?
Hm. Certainly cause for an update if accurate, but do these people make the same claims as the "little grey men" crowd around the people that I mentioned? My impression was that there was a separate push a few years ago around the "Tic Tac" videos, which was much more measured and ambiguous and had the vibes of some intel operation that is too 8D-chessy for me to understand, rather than actual hints of confirmed aliens. (Baiting someone into revealing or believing something? My favourite theory at the time was that some branch of the USG wanted to signal to the PRC that they may have developed tech for spoofing input to/coherently dazzling complex integrated sensor systems, by way of using it on their own during a training exercise) It makes sense that that sort of undertaking would get fire support from real top brass. Did any of the people you listed directly vouch for any member of the batch that I mentioned?
The result will likely reflect the will of the people only in the most tenuous sense.
This conclusion seems to require two very specific assumptions to hold:
-
Election outcomes reflecting the will of 49% of the voters rather than 51% of the voters is a "most tenuous sense" of "reflecting the will".
-
For each voter coming in to vote, the option they intended to vote for reflects their will 100%, and the other option reflects their will 0%.
The first one is an assertion about the meaning of elections, and the second one is an assertion about the alignment between candidates and voter intent. Both of them seem sketchy to me, though I think that my objection to the second one will be the more compelling one.
For the first one, I think the underlying assumption that the majority winner, however narrow, gets the moral label of representing the will of the people and can do whatever they want is already flawed, and treating the 50% mark as magical has similar vibes to me as that often-mocked idea that by lusting after a 17-years-and-364-days-old you are a filthy pedophile, but the 18-years-and-0-days-old one? You go, boy. Democratic elections aren't some game you play where the winner gets to rule in whatever way they want up to and including "execute everyone who voted for the loser" and sportsmanship demands that the loser go along with it, but primarily a common knowledge machine for support, coupled with a power assignment mechanism that is meant to give the ones that are most likely to benefit from the common knowledge a shot at governing. This is why many systems give election losers a chance to form a government if the winners failed to get an absolute majority coalition, and why big political vibe shifts are often secured by votes of confidence or technically-unrelated polls/plebiscites that are advertised as such. ("Let it be known that a vote for Prop 1234 is a signal of continued support for me!")
The primary function of having 51% of people vote for you is that every individual knows that if they tried to start an uprising against you, about 51% of people would tend to oppose it, and everyone know that everyone knows, etc.; coupled with common-sense understanding of status quo bias even among those who did not vote for the ruler, the hope is that prospective revolutionaries know that it's not worth to try and start an abortive attempt (that would be negative-sum for the polity). The ruler, on the other hand, knows that with a 51% result their options are limited, because if they do things that might really piss off the other 49% while leaving their 51% supporters at most lukewarm, the common knowledge that a revolution is doomed will disappear.
None of these considerations change by a lot if the 49% and the 51% figure are swapped, since the genuine 51% winner already has to govern in a way that keeps the 49% somewhat happy (and thus reflect their will) under all but the most extreme assumptions of voters being emotionless optimiser-bots for completely disparate value functions and equal combat stats, so 49% don't revolt because they would lose and 51% do whatever they want because they would win. In reality, 51% motivated vs. 49% unmotivated win by about as much as 49% motivated vs. 51% unmotivated.
For the second one, why do you think it comes to pass that election after election in the US two-party system is this close? Is there some mystery biological mechanism that makes about 50% of Americans 100%-Democrat-0%-Republican and the other half 0%-Democrat-100%-Republican, like about 50% are female? Clearly the more sensible theory is that the parties are the ones that, for whatever reason, shift every election season so that about 50% of voters vote for them. You could postulate all sorts of mechanisms for why this would be the case, but the details don't particularly matter for this argument. All that matters is that parties must have the liberty to shift the margin of their votership quite freely, and this implies that the marginal, for example, Democrat voter can't plausibly be one whose will is actually 0% represented by the Republican option, because otherwise how could the Republican party slightly tweak their platform/message and turn that voter into a Republican voter? Instead, there must evidently be a band of voters along the middle who, in a given election, are just slightly more in favour of one party than the other, and considering the stability of the approx. 50-50 split, this band is surely wider than 1%. For these voters, if the other party wins, their overall political will is maybe reflected by 49%; but also, if the party they voted for won, their will would only be reflected by 51% or so, because they were equally marginal pickings for their own party as it shifted its platform to "ride the margin"!
In short, for a number of people well in excess of 1%, the election outcome being flipped by 1% worth of noise is not the cataclysmic event of "their will being reflected in the most tenuous sense", but the fairly mundane event of their will being reflected a tiny bit less than otherwise. The only ones for whom this event is cataclysmic are those deeply aligned with one or the other party, the actual near-100% D/Rs (who I'm sure are overrepresented here), but why are they specifically entitled to have their will reflected to any significant degree?
On top of everything, if the wrong votes bother you, why aren't you bothered by the non-voters? What percentage of those actually reflect a will to not vote, as opposed to people who fully intended to vote for one party or another but couldn't, be it because their car broke down on the day, their employer didn't give them a day off, they overslept, their postal vote got lost or whatever? What percentage of people who did vote did so because they were idle on the day and found themselves near a polling station and thought "hell, why not" without having any opinion on the election? (Happened to me once!)
The best theory continues being that the US government employs a lot of people and does not actually have very strong gatekeeping, so weirdos (of the type that would convince themselves that they have seen UFO evidence, or perhaps make up a story for grift/wishful thinking and come to believe it for real) can get in and thrive. Every time these characters (Lazar, Elizondo, Grusch...) are brought up, what jumps out at me is how obviously different their manner of speech and even their names sound from "serious" members of the US military that are quoted on "serious" topics - the Mearsheimers, Gradies and Saltzmans, inevitably of Jewish, Nordic or sometimes Irish extraction, patrician-sounding first names and middle initials. This alone suggests that there is some ethnic-cultural divide at play here, and the UFO crowd might be different enough from normal spokespeople that heuristics of trustworthiness and willingness to make stuff up which were trained on official communication would not actually be valid.
I'll take the point that I was being overly dramatic with the comparison, and that this did not help my case. I got somewhat drunk on spite there. However, I stand by the intended point, stripped of the drama: if you make it so that certain users or viewpoints can't be attacked, you might get some more people to like those users and viewpoints, but you'll make others quietly hate and resent you and the organisation that gave you the power.
I've been following the discussions about the moderation system for long enough that I'm quite familiar with these principles you explained; I just think they are bad and have done a lot of damage to the discourse, which you only don't see because you keep grading yourself on a curve and by deferring to the sentiment of the very community that you create by following this approach. If you drive away most people who disagree, you will naturally see agreement up until the point where you have evaporated down to a size such that sentiment shifts to "we have a great community, but somehow nobody wants to join and listen to our great points". /r/CWR, in its own "community sentiment", felt that it was doing great right down to the point of maybe getting 100 posts a week. If you were serious about wanting a space in which people with different politics talk to each other, you should if anything have done the opposite, and treated any tendency in "community sentiment" as indicative of a growth that needs to be pruned.
Either way, being this explicit about protecting a user from criticism on the basis of a long record of AAQCs is a new extreme for this system; we seem to be evolving from a soft loop along the lines of "n% of the community like this user -> user gets upvotes and AAQCs -> user gets away with more extreme posts -> some people who dislike this leave -> m% (m>n) of the community like this user" to a harder loop where the penultimate step is "some people who dislike this get banned". In some alternative timeline that might have only differed from the current one by a handful of votes here and there at first, coffee_enjoyer would have been the "excellent poster with an absolutely stellar history", and Dean would be the one getting called a single-issue poster and told that he narrowly avoided a ban. I don't want to hide the bias that stems from the circumstance that I would mildly prefer that timeline over the current one (very mildly, though), but that callouts based on substance and discussion discipline get treated this way at all is bad, and that you have set up a system that amplifies small differences in initial conditions in such a fashion makes it seem unlikely that this was an intentional act of "gardening" as opposed to excuses being made for a yard full of weeds.
Yeah, I feel like I am in the same boat as you. I think the only mercy there is that AAQCed rants with the right political valence, like the one I produced, often wind up stringing along more deserving posts like Primaprimaprima's (who was my interlocutor in that exchange, frankly produced much better and more interesting points, and would probably still have been sitting at negative upvotes if it weren't for the AAQC-induced attention). Perhaps someone with a more optimistic outlook could say that inspiring actually good responses is a quality all its own.
Yes. Dean is an excellent poster with an absolutely stellar history of making quality contributions to the Motte. He is probably in the top 5 userbase favorites. You, too, have made some good posts in the past, which is one of the reasons I haven't banned you yet. But if you're gonna rain on the AAQC parade any time your ox gets gored, I'll count it against you.
I think that glazing an individual user in this fashion in a modhat comment is inappropriate and reflects badly on the moderation. Yes, I will freely admit that this sentiment is coloured by the circumstance that I cannot stand this particular user. (I could expound at length why I would consider him to be a single-issue poster - as I see it, he is here to produce impassioned defenses of US neoconservatism with the same single-minded determination, attention to detail and absolute lack of interest in countervailing evidence as our most notorious JQ posters - but you have made it clear that you would not want to hear) Personal antipathy and feuds between users are a pretty normal sight here, though. Normally one would expect mods to act as a, well, moderating force on them - yet this sort of statement fills me (and presumably anyone else who would disagree with him) with negative levels of confidence that in the event of an interaction gone sour I would get a fair hearing. That is only moderating in the way Putin's rule is moderating opposition in Russia, which is to say it channels resentment into other outlets rather than reducing it.
My parents in the Soviet Union were made to spend the summers of their university years helping out with the potato harvest somewhere down south, for a similar purpose. Funny how the valence of these ideas evolves.
Sorry in advance that I'm only responding to part of your points (and thanks a lot for writing them; I thought I should be more explicit about appreciating it since you are otherwise just eating downvotes from the lurker gallery) - I have read and thought about everything, but it was a choice between not responding at all and procrastinating way more than I can justify to myself.
So I think the poetic language is a good thing, up to a point (you can always take anything too far, of course).
I don't think "poetic" is the right term for what I see in these writings. A poet, I imagine, is someone who finds new, surprising and accessible ways of expressing a complex or rare sentiment; an obscurantist finds complex and inaccessible ways of circumscribing a common or simple one.
When you have this sort of interaction repeatedly when discussing philosophy, where people say "I don't know what that means, but I know it's bullshit", it starts to wear on you.
Well, it equally wears on you when you repeatedly have an interaction with people who essentially say "I don't know what that means, but I know it's deep". I'm sure you could see some symmetry between those who are serious about philosophy fighting off hordes of foot-soldiers of the tribe that is opposed to the philosophers' coalition and those who are serious about anti-philosophy fighting off hordes of foot-soldiers of Team Philosophers, but the symmetry is broken by the philosophers alone being in the position where they could have chosen to express themselves in a way that forestalls the "I don't know what that means" part.
Relatedly, insofar as it addresses why there are such foot-soldiers on the philosophers' side, and why people like you may underappreciate their number and impact -
I think it's helpful to think of continental philosophy as a sort of 20th century version of TheMotte for French academics. They had their own memeplex, their own points of reference, there was a whole context surrounding it that isn't immediately obvious if you're approaching it for the first time in 2024. These guys all knew each other, they went to the same seminars and published in the same journals; sometimes they were writing "serious" arguments, and sometimes they were just shitposting at each other. A lot of times on TheMotte we'll have someone come along and say "y'know, I've just been thinkin' about this thing" - about leftists and rightists, about men and women, about whatever it is. And then they make some sweeping claim, that may or may not be particularly well supported empirically, but often enough it still makes you go "y'know, I think that guy might be onto something". And that's often the sort of value I get out of continental philosophy. Plainly there's some sort of value in this activity that we do on TheMotte, because we all keep coming here.
I think this is an instance of the Motte of a Motte-and-Bailey that is commonly deployed in defense of every academic discipline that operates according to "humanities rules". Motte: "This is just a bunch of guys shooting the shit. Sometimes they even produce interesting things that I personally enjoy. Why do you, an outsider who doesn't even appreciate any of this, barge in and try to impose rules such as your 'epistemic standards'?" Bailey: "These people are the world authorities on philosophy. We pay them to do philosophy and all philosophers agree that they are the most influential and insightful philosophers, so we should defer to them in matters of philosophy." As a result, there are Lacanians and Deleuzians sitting in IRBs and ethics boards and asking to be persuaded, in their terms, before I am allowed to use my funding to perform scientific experiments (this is mildly overstated for the sake of argument; I have only dabbled in stuff with human subjects and most of my work is mercifully untouched beyond the 60% institutional overhead that is used to subsidise the humanities); we defer to them in questions of what arguments are acceptable in politics and school; and ultimately they are what anchors the chains of trust and authority that we use to determine which political movements are legitimate (at risk of pulling clichés from the bingo board, the argument that the druggie who runs off with five pairs of sneakers as he torches the store is misguided but has his heart in the right place ultimately leads back, via many chains of simplification for political expediency, to some humanities tract full of "poetic language") and which ones are to be treated as threats.
(The most prominent not-obviously-political counterpart of the same dynamic result in cities tiled with brutalist wannabe 1984 film sets. I think people feel the commonalities between a two on a visceral level: it's no accident that Orbán's Budapest is one of the few European capitals that is basically devoid of modern architecture.)
As I remember, the disputes were principally about factual questions that were relevant for the moral dimension - whether and how significantly the 2014 revolution was orchestrated by Western countries, to what extent neo-Nazi movements were a driving political force on the Ukrainian side, whether and to what extent the Ukrainians committed actions that ought to lower their moral standing by Western standards before and after the Russian invasion (extrajudicial killings, ethnic and political persecution, various forms of corruption...), and to what extent either of the two armies was "clean" or engaged in atrocities (targeting civilians vs. using civilians as shields, allegations of massacres (Bucha) vs. allegations of false-flag massacres (Kupiansk), abuse/killing of POWs and whether it is systemic, both sides accusing the other of using "barrier troops" with orders to shoot those who retreat or surrender).
The thing is, manipulative advancement of a moral case for some cause through selective reporting/FUD/editorializing is exactly what most of the resident witches would accuse the Western media of in contexts where they are at odds with it. The NYT and WaPo were not disputing that BLM protests were happening, or that property damage occurred as part of the protests, but (were charged by those opposed to BLM to be) distorting the reporting on the scale of the property damage, amplifying information that made anti-BLM look bad and pro-BLM look good and thereby misrepresenting the moral qualities of the protesters and those they were protesting against to the point that someone who read their coverage would come to the opposite conclusion regarding which side deserved support from what those opposed to it thought was right. This is the shape of basically every progressive media establishment vs. basket of heterodox deplorables dispute, whether it is about added punctuation in Biden transcripts vs. removed punctuation in Trump transcripts or grifters sleeping around for reviews=?women artists trying to spread high culture to video games and getting a torrent of death threats trying to put them in their place. Yet, the same people who have no problem coming down on the media conspiracy theory side, and bemoaning the impenetrable wall of argument-by-authority and social pressure defending the official narrative, in each of those would then happily insinuate that you are a brainrotten conspiracy theorist if for example you expressed doubt about the Bucha story.
Unfortunately, knowledge of Gell-Mann amnesia as a meme/antimeme is not nearly strong enough to overcome the temptation of a powerful institution's offer of ammo to defend your ingroup's membership-defining beliefs. Remember how, at the outbreak of the Ukraine war, the overwhelming majority in this forum suddenly developed unconditional trust in consensus MSM reporting, if only on that topic?
Interesting post, but I am reminded of how revolting and deleterious I find continental philosophy. Sure, they sometimes stumble upon true and interesting statements - perhaps even quite often, like a blind chicken, granted the leisure to peck at the yard all day because the farmer will spoonfeed it three times a day anyway, finding a good number of grains - but the obscurantist language only really seems to serve the purposes of instilling delusions of the speaker's intelligence, hide argumentative flaws and open up "you don't get it" as a defense against those who point them out. Take, for example, the argument about incest towards the end. Stripped of its whoa-dude lingo, what's left of it seems to be some argument along the lines of:
-
Marriage restrictions serve the point of creating the framing conditions for an economy where fathers sell off their daughters in return for other spoils. Sure, nothing wrong with that, because creating arbitrary systems of rules is cool in my books.
-
However, you don't need to ban mother-son incest to enable the above economy!
-
Some people say that there might be other reasons why incest is banned, such as biology. But that's nonsense! Farmers inbreed their plants and lifestock all the time, so how can it be bad?
-
Therefore, there is no """"objective"""" reason to prohibit mother-son incest. It's all arbitrary systems of rules! By the way, arbitrary systems of rules are cool.
Disassembled in this way, the argument is clearly lazy and stupid. Human communities differ from the charges of a farmer in relevant ways - a farmer can breed 99 unviable monstrosities that he will promptly cull and 1 sort of viable semi-monstrosity with a desirable trait that can then be isolated in subsequent generations. The semi-monstrosity does not need to be healthy or fend for itself, because the farmer can just coddle and feed it until it is old enough to be crossbred with a healthier specimen in the hope of selectively getting rid of the deleterious traits only, at negligible cost to the farmer; neither the culling nor the coddling of the mutant impose any cost on the community of other farm animals/plants, because they don't really have a community or obligation to look out for each other; and neither of them will meaningfully resist their culling, introducing the choice between violence and dysgenic load, because the farmer is presumed to have an effective monopoly on violence.
This is not a particularly difficult counterargument to the counterargument to stumble upon. Unfortunately, the working mode of continental philosophy made it impossible for continental philosophy to consider it - the authors themselves would never write it, because ticking boxes like this would signal self-doubt and weakness that is entirely at odds with the image of the infallible sage that descends from his mountain to pronounce deep wisdom that the lowly students must compete with each other to understand, which a Continental Philosopher is supposed to project; and if one of the students pointed it out, he would presumably just receive a pitying smirk from Lacan, and perhaps a remark about how he is clearly yet to grasp the difference between the signifer and the combinatoire or something. Maybe some other student could help him out by writing a longer Lacanian tract expounding on how he doesn't get it. Who would side with some beta nitpicker over the chad sage who has his own (surname)-ian adjective as a lemma in the Collins English Dictionary?
If the greatest works of art are the ones that induce the most trauma, then why don't we just, I dunno, build a "sculpture" that cuts people's legs off. That would be quite traumatic, so wouldn't that thereby be the greatest work of art?
I have little doubt that the Eisenmans of the world would go for this if they could get away with it.
the entire post-10/7 conflict in Gaza was a sinister plot for Israelis to expropriate Gazan land
That's silly only because there is nothing subtle about it. Israel was founded on taking land from the assorted Arabs that lived there before, and has repeatedly expanded by doing that over and over again. With everything it does, it grabs more land. Grabbing and holding land for its privileged ethnic group is its entire purpose.
But even here you're wrong; the unprovoked nature of the 10/7 attack,
Italics are not a substitute for an argument. You can't possibly be arguing that Israel did nothing to Palestinians before 10/7, so the only thing your argument can possibly rest on is saying that somehow what it did before is excluded from consideration as a provocation. Have you presented any argument for that, apart from "deaths dealt out tit-for-tat", i.e. saying that the "Palestinians started it", i.e. slicing up a sequence of mutual provocations in a convenient way?
This is what they are actually doing, probably to their detriment.
60% of Palestinian fatalities since 10/7 on the first infographic I could find are women, children and the elderly. I have seen plenty of pictures of whole blocks being levelled. If that is surgical precision, i.e. those killings were targeted and deliberate, I think we are deep in genocidal territory, though I'm sure its defenders will have a story about how they vetted everyone in those blocks they levelled and the children were terrorists too.
Note also that per the infographic, something like 2-3% of Israeli 10/7 fatalities are children, to 32% of Palestinian fatalities since then. And then you claim that the Palestinians are the ones killing indiscriminately?
the analysis of John Spencer, an instructor in urban warfare at West Point
Might be more interesting if it weren't by someone who would almost certainly lose their job if they came to a different conclusion.
Not a valid basis to wage war or attack random civilians.
Surely having your homeland invaded and occupied is a valid basis to wage war. I will concede that apart from a crazy fringe the Israeli side is not technically arguing that having random civilians on your side attacked is a valid basis to attack random civilians; instead they just engage in gaslighting and Soviet-level denials that they are attacking random civilians, all while continuing to do it. I am genuinely unsure if a greater evil masquerading as good is better than an unapologetic lesser evil.
Interesting way to describe the outcome of a lawsuit
Israeli court: "seems legit to me"
That's not how any of this works, and a clear isolated demand for rigor. No-one ever analyzes any other armed conflict using this framework.
You are the one who started talking about scale, implicitly suggesting that the scale of the Oct 7th attack was what made it sufficient as a justification for Israel killing 43k Palestinians. I just took this implication, as I understood it, at face value. If this is not the argument you intended, then please explain yourself better.
The objective is not "revenge killings of undifferentiated Palestinians," but the destruction of the armed terrorist group that attacked Israelis - Hamas - either through elimination or forcing them to surrender and disperse, with a secondary objective of recovering the individuals who Hamas kidnapped on 10/7.
I'm sure the objective of Hamas could also be described by them as the destruction of the armed terrorist group that attacked Palestinians - the Israeli state - either through elimination or forcing them to surrender and disperse, with a secondary objective of recovering any individuals that Israel has locked away. Israel says that its mass killings of completely uninvolved civilians are inevitable because it has no better way to break Palestinian organised resistance (Hamas) specifically without putting more of its own people at risk; I'm sure Hamas also sees no better way to break Israeli organised resistance than to spread terror and attack whatever civilians they can get their hands on. If you think it's unfair to demand that Israel restrict itself to surgical operations against Hamas militants that would probably result in 5-10x the military casualties relative to just levelling whole areas, then surely it's also unfair to demand that Hamas restrict itself to surgical operations against the IDF that would probably result in them just getting gunned down ineffectually.
from your own source (...)
Those seem pretty cherry-picked from the articles. The 2021 article starts with a description of Israeli police sabotaging a religious observance so that it would not disturb a political speech of their PM, and then later of Israel seizing the homes of some Palestinians, which resulted in protests being violently suppressed during which the first deaths occurred on both sides. You (and partially Wikipedia) are doing the same thing here again at smaller scale, taking a fairly uniformly distributed timeline of alternating incidents of Palestinians killing some Israelis and Israelis killing many more Palestinians - inevitably more civilians than militants on either side - and placing arbitrary cutoff points to break the sequence up into single "incidents" that look like they start with Palestinians killing someone and then Israel engaging in totally justified manifold retaliation.
"He randomly punched me, then I broke his arm. Then he randomly punched me again, and I broke his leg in response. Then he randomly kicked me in the nuts for no reason with his other leg. Of course I stabbed his eye out, I mean, who wouldn't? Being kicked in the nuts can have serious consequences and nobody should have to put up with that. What, you say I started it by stabbing him in 1948? Do you realise how crazy you sound, claiming that he has the right to kick me in the nuts over something from 1948? Besides, his dad who was also beating him all the time back in the 1940s said I was free to do to him whatever I wanted!"
What was the inciting incident demanding recompense on the scale of kidnapping, raping, and murdering partiers at a disco festival?
If we just want to go one step back, that's easy. Per the first Google hit, Israel killed something like 43k Palestinians since Oct 7 attack, establishing that the alleged appropriate revenge ratio is somewhere around 40:1. So we just need to find ~1000/40=25 Palestinians that Israel killed before Oct 7. More were killed by Israel just in 2022, and many more in 2021. I don't think being at a disco festival conveys a uniquely high value to your life, as opposed to, say, just being blown up in your home.
Israel has offered peace multiple times, and when its offers were accepted it honored those agreements.
The relevant timeline just around settlements has plenty of evidence to the contrary, including from Israeli sources. Either way, it's easy to offer peace from a position of overwhelming strength.
Having recently spent a couple of years in Sweden, what struck me about it was actually how, despite this reputation, its native culture was actually strikingly strong and resilient to universal culture intrusion. Compared to other European cultures I have lived in, they have an abundance of native rituals ranging from involved (midsummer celebrations) to small (corporate Christmas buffets, the sacred annual pastry cycle and other random food traditions, grown adults holding annual Skansen passes so they can go and dance to små grodorna around a tree whenever the occasion calls for it) which approximately everyone observes without a hint of irony. There is a harder-to-pin-down social/temperamental cultural package that struck me as every bit as peculiar as the Japanese one, political culture that has largely resisted US brainrot (I saw a peaceful and constructive 6-ish-way public debate between representatives of every major party including the turbofeminists and the anti-immigration populists in a town square) and plenty of civil-society institutions like only slightly culty countryside compounds hosting debate retreats for politically interested youths.
Moreover, most immigrants I encountered were getting rapidly and obviously assimilated into this package. A second-generation Swedish-Iranian invited me to a kräftskiva they were hosting at their place in some famous problematic suburb, and I have more than once been given the stink-eye by East Asians who lived there for a few years (but came to stay) for not making enough of an effort to learn the language. (I'm sorry! Towards the end I could do simple everyday conversations and read/fill in most of the paperwork that came my way, but I never found the time to take a course or deliberately practice.)
This all was a far cry from what I've experienced in Germany or Austria, where the immigrants proudly keep to themselves or at best get assimilated to anglophone universal culture directly, skipping the local step, and the natives are sheepish about what little distinct native habits remain, while the political culture can be summed up as binging on US news and being excited for native developments only insofar as votes for FPÖ/Greens/AfD/NEOS may contribute to owning the American outgroup or embolden them. In summary, Sweden is among the countries I would be least worried about.
If this is a justification, why does the same reasoning not work to justify the Palestinian Oct 7 attack? There is an obviously truthful reading of the situation, which is that Israelis and Palestinians are locked into a multigenerational civil war/blood feud that can only end by one side being wiped out or someone stronger swooping in and separating the combatants, and then there are the two competing narratives that aim to marshal support for one of the sides by selectively word-gaming away the justifications that the other side invokes when turning the ratchet.
Right, well, moderation compounds. If in two weeks you were to ban somebody else for making posts like this, maybe the user you just banned would be there to complain that you are being too harsh.
If providing a home for it was not the goal, the sneering and blatant culture-warring from the forum's right edge should have been contained much more relentlessly from the outset. Now that they have numbers and precedent on their side, it's natural that belated attempts to moderate this behaviour away will result in defiant "community sentiment". I'm sorry that I'm joining in on making your life hard, but I see no better way to level the incentive landscape.
Only warnings for those two posts (and then padded with reassurances like "which usually we'd probably let go"), and now a mere two weeks? Was there an executive decision to let the forum turn into an /r/CWR-lite space?
The three main theories would be (1) that accusations of blatant partisanship are actually starting to hurt the self-perception of some of those involved; (2) that they are trying to build up a defense because they are expecting a backlash against anti-Trump media; and (3) that some PR advisor told them about a significant pool of people that is unreachable by traditional media messaging because they think the media is blatantly partisan, and they need to take steps to raise the weight that those voters assign to media reporting.
My single encounter with his speeches (as I generally can't stand video/chatter content) has been a live stream of some recent rally that I only tuned into because I randomly entertained the thought of playing the Polymarket "will Trump say Border more than 25 times" game, and my immediate first impression was that he really just sounded shockingly old and tired. I don't think I got a sense of mental decline beyond what is a necessary consequence of old age, and he sounded way sharper than I remember Biden doing in the one video I saw of his fatal debate, but he certainly didn't come across as either spry or quick-witted. I don't think I have any particularly negative emotions towards him nor that he has declined to a point that would be extraordinary for a head of state, but it did seem to me like those who claim that he currently presents a picture of rhetorical brilliance and strength must be suffering from a case of reverse TDS.
This seems to be saying that beating anti-wokes with a newspaper convinced those who were already members of the progressive coalition to get with the program and update to a different sub-ideology in their camp, not that it had any effect to dissuade those who were targeted by it. You could argue that there was a similar pool of proto-allies that merely needed to be scared into backing a promising new strategy when Trumpism first came around and had to fight against older schools of conservatism in the Republican coalition, but by now that pool seems to have been largely exhausted.
The only way, the only way to convince the Democrats that wokeness is Not Okay is to rub their noses in it like a dog. Smack them on the snout with a rolled up newspaper and proclaim "BAD!" in a thunderous shout.
Repetition and italics are no substitute for an argument for a claim as strong as the one you are making here. Not only can't you think of any other way, but you are also convinced that the rolled up newspaper would work? On what basis?
Do you think that with the tables turned, it works on you? Does the cultural strategy run by progressives for the past n years, with your candidates dragged through courts and media, your adherents marginalised from work and education, and your cultural artifacts vandalised, not amount to repeated blows with a rolled-up newspaper to the nose of anti-wokes? I assume that their doing of this is based on a very similar sentiment as yours, so why is it not working for them? Why are you not convinced yet that anti-wokeness is Not Okay?
I can't discern him breaking any rules, or you explicitly accusing of breaking him of any rules, apart from the subjective "wildcard rule" about obnoxiousness. It's fine to have a wildcard rule that essentially says "don't do things we don't like", but to then try to pin the "breaking the rules" label on someone who only ran afoul of that rule is somewhere between a case of the noncentral fallacy and plain self-aggrandizement, where you expect other people to treat your taste with the same reverence as a written rule.
I think hounding other posters for evidence and forcing them to produce more evidence in a more legible way is an unalloyed good, actually. I'd love for you to prove me wrong, and show me an instance where someone is doing the same thing for a position that I agree with or user that I like where I think that it would be appropriate to moderate the pursuers. The closest example I can remember is where back in the Reddit era, people were piling up on darwin2000 (might have gotten the number part wrong) over not taking responsibility for boldly wrong predictions (in contexts such as the Smollett case). I was rather fond of him as a user and thought that he was an asset by virtue of putting out some overly welcoming hearths by merely existing, but was absolutely in favour of him being held accountable in the way he was.
I initially didn't want to make an argument based on accusations of bias, but looking through your posting history it seems plainly evident that you are deeply aligned with Dean on the Israel/Palestine question, and back the Israeli side in a way that can't be described as dispassionate. Are you sure that you are not letting your animus towards a side blind you to the fact that you are just using the rule that basically says "excuse to be deployed in edge cases" as an excuse in a case that is not particularly on edge? It's not like not being candid about this, or mostly avoiding engagement on substance (easy when an "excellent poster" is around to make your case for you anyway), magically makes you neutral. The least you could have done to not make this look as bad would have been to recuse yourself and let this be handled by another moderator who can express his views of the object-level issue with fewer expletives than this.
Well, forget about him. Can you explain to me, or anyone else, why he was being moderated? My current understanding is that you like Dean's posts in general and are moreover extremely unsympathetic to the anti-Israel position, and therefore perceive any persistent attempt to impose a tax on Dean's pro-Israel posting in its present shape as something that needs to be suppressed using the wildcard rule. Is this accurate?
The clause doesn't have to be parsed as "(more extreme) posts" for the cycle to hold; it is absolutely sufficient for it to be "more (extreme posts)". Plenty of completely normal posts these days would have been moderated 5 years ago - and the way in which they are bad was originally trailblazed by "quality posters" who evidently were so favoured that unless someone took one for the team and raised a stink out in the open, you wouldn't even know that reports were just being redirected into the trash due to their standing, as opposed to nobody seeing a problem at all to begin with. Once the prolific and beloved posters all do it, the nobodies are free to follow suit.
Is this a belief that's based on a concrete observation of bad things that happened when you "worried too much", or just rationalising the easy option of going with your gut?
One does not make up for the other. People can still make good posts and interesting conversation away from a welcoming hearth, but by definition they won't after they had to bear their final straw. You can run a good version of this forum while being a welcoming hearth to nobody, but you can't run one while putting the final straw on too many, especially if you selectively do so on just about everyone except those having a particular gamut of opinion.
Do you imagine there is any argument or evidence at all that could persuade you to change your current approach to moderation, or is it a matter of either having to take your ride to wherever it leads or getting off?
More options
Context Copy link