No_one
Underemployed Slav. Likes playing Factorio.
User ID: 1042
No_one
4hr ago
Please be serious. Where Putin puts his forces after taking out Ukraine is the concern.
There's nothing valuable in the Baltics whatsoever. Nothing at all. The population would mostly flee and be happily snapped up by European union which needs wagies. Baltic sea navigation wouldn't be improved, actually seizing the Baltic state could possibly make western Europe close the Danish straits.
No_one
4hr ago
It's not about budgets.
US doesn't have the industrial capacity to counter China. The US war plan, right now, relies on a hail mary of "maybe if we spam 1000 improved Tomahawk missiles at (mobile) Chinese batteries from submarines off the coast we'll be able to kill enough of these to be able to operate carriers near Taiwan.
Mind you US Tomahawk inventory is about 1k. (Or 2k) I dunno, but in any case only a fraction can even hit mobile targets even theoretically and assuming, during a war that US would be able to observe China unmolested by laser satellite dazzlers is brave in itself.
No_one
4hr ago
especially when we've been able to help hold back Russian forces for this long while barely even lifting a pinky
Incredible viewpoint. I'd advise never speaking in that manner to Ukrainians because they're going to be justifiably somewhat bitter about the half-million people who died BECAUSE Americans assured Ukraine they could help them defeat Russia.
No_one
5hr ago
ISW is considered mostly a joke by people who aren't pro-Ukrainian. Nakedly partisan, not that smart. E.g. they said this about the failed Ukrainian summer offensive.
Putin may have ordered the Russian military command to hold all Russia’s initial defensive positions to create the illusion that Ukrainian counteroffensives have not achieved any tactical or operational effects despite substantial Western support.
No_one
9hr ago
Interesting developments in Ukraine. Very unclear what's going on, but possibly US supported change of leadership within the near future. That's just a guess.
On Friday the 18th, there were two hit pieces on Zelensky, one in FT and another in Spectator. TL;DR on them is: West is disappointed with Zelensky because he appears to be using the cover of war to attack people who were fighting against corruption in Ukraine and using authoritarian means to go after politicians who aren't seen as fully loyal to him.
That's not new - Ukrainians have been muttering about precisely that for years. But Westerners are reading it now, and as has been pointed out, if you're reading it, it's for you..
There were some Ukrainian and one older Politico.EU articles with a similar tone but all much lower profile. Now the Man wants us to know Zelensky is not the greatest hero since Churchill. Why?
Then, on Saturday, in a surprising move, Zelensky called for negotiations. Here's Guardian reporting on it..
Looking at the previous round of negotiations, those were futile. Without concessions that Ukrainians, especially the nationalists find unthinkable, Russians aren't stopping. In addition last week Trump gave Russia some sort of '50 days' ultimatum.. No idea what that means- threatening tariffs on a country that has had 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on it seems odd.
The last time(end of may '25) they tried negotiating there was no agreement (Russians wanted the 4 oblasts, a little land in them they didn't have yet and ofc Crimea), which Ukraine didn't want to agree too even though they have, at present, a snowball's chance in hell of regaining any territory and are inexorably losing more at an escalating pace. Mind you, this is pretty much 'minimalism' on the Russian side. Ukrainians, just to start proper negotiations wanted an 'unconditional 30 day ceasefire', to which Russians were unwilling to agree because they thought it was just a stalling tactic to get time to build more defensive lines.
There's no reason to believe Russians are going to be in any way more amenable this time -they've taken more ground, their forces are being sustained, unlike the Ukrainian ones.
Town of Pokrovsk (~70k before war) whose supply lines have been interdicted for months now & ofc town itself has been under constant attrition is getting ever more cut off. Russians have massed forces to actually cut off the town and Ukraine doesn't have any reserves to counter that, so there's risk of the city getting wholly cut off.
So what to make of it? Seymour Hersh claims that US wants to replace Zelensky with Zaluzhny. A regime journalist calls that 'Ukrainian disinformation'..
But Hersh also claims US is trying to reach an agreement with Russia while it's still possible. Russians who are confident they can see it through obviously don't want to make any deal that'd be less than full recognition of conquered territory & Finlandization of rump Ukraine. So, why even attempt to negotiate? If Zelensky were to make peace, he'd have to fight the nationalists who won't give up this easily, go against his western sponsors who don't want the war to end either. He clearly doesn't have support to end the war.
It looks like desperate flailing from Zelensky's side. Or is the army personnel/ammo situation so critical that he expects it to be close to collapse within a month? Very little is known about how bad it is for AFU (it's all secret and they rarely say anything). About the best report is this Polish one, which says Ukraine requires 300,000 soldiers to fully staff its combat formations, and that presently there are cca 300,000 men in the trenches.
No_one
1d ago
Maybe you should give it a try, no? I mean, same tribe, even vaguely similar social circle.
No_one
1d ago
No, he's not wrong. They were generally older. The youngest girl ever mentioned was 12, and seeing how they were generally older, she probably looked older than she actually was.
Girls start puberty, on average, around 11 in late 20th century America. So, odds are, while this was obviously very wrong that she was not, biologically, a child.
No_one
1d ago
There's little reason to believe D-T fusion will ever be employed for grid power generation. Here's a good read on it. Power density of D-T fusion reactors is inherently lower, so reactors have to be much bigger to have the same power.
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-fusion-power
Between nuclear reactors already being more expensive, a more expensive radiation-producing method of power generation doesn't seem likely to ever be employed at scale.
No_one
2d ago
His day job was mostly medical research and teaching. Wasn't unsuccessful at it, quite well regarded. Became a full professor eventually. (it's a bigger deal/more rare in eastern Europe than in US) Personally I think he wasn't (when younger) as scatter-brained as he pretended to be and used it as an excuse.
No_one
2d ago
I don't think it was a real war. More like police action / counterinsurgency operation.
Yugoslavia.. there was a fair bit of pitched combat there, no?
No_one
2d ago
One of the weirdest things I noticed is that the best chess player in the family (he was in top 20 nation wide(small country tho) in his prime, I think) is so scatter-brained that car maintenance and dealing with paperwork was something his wife did.
He has legendary skills at messing up anything computer related.
No_one
3d ago
Ukraine has ..about 40 Gepard systems, I think. Maybe in total 60 high performance point defense systems. Definitely not enough to cover all targets of military importance around the country.
How hard can it be to conscript these migrants? The US conscripted blacks in ww2, despite an extensive segregation regime and discrimination..
In WW2, US largely used blacks in non-combat roles. The few combat units that existed were a very mixed bag. Also performed quite badly, at least the infantry division in Italy. US also suffered low overall casualties. In Vietnam, US casualties overall were miniscule (by European war standards) and yet there was quite a lot of popular discontent around the draft.
But if they go in on the Baltics and NATO gives up then NATO is a complete joke, they're dispensed to the cuck chair of history.
And? That's the predictable outcome. What else can you say about current EU leadership except that they're stupid cucks?
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They let themselves be signed up for the American plan of showing Russia who is who in Ukraine. That plane was based on the assumptions Russians have the same level of agency as pudding.
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Well, now it's years later and Ukraine still isn't getting enough weapons, European governments are ever more distrusted by the population, half of Germany's welfare goes to foreigners. In short, these people are cucks and their countries rightfully belong in the 'cuck chair of history' until the regimes are overthrown and unfucked. Welfare state over, migrants gone, retirees half starving. Who has the will to do that? Nobody. (but I'm a pessimist)
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Despite knowing since at least 2020 that there'd be war, the same governments haven't done anything to secure popular support such as getting rid of the migrants. Iran and Pakistan can do mass deportations, but France or Germany can't. Trust in government in Germany is at an all time post-1950 low.
And let's remember that this is still Europe, these are the people who conquered almost all of the world.
No, they aren't. They are the retarded liberal grandchildren of people who weren't even sure conquering the world was a good idea.
The US may well lose in Asia but at that point it's a new world order and all bets are off, NATO may well disintegrate or we see full WW3 or something else.
There won't be a 'full WW3' because even as bad as US getting kicked out of East Asia could be-and I suspect it'll happen gently, in a 'face-saving' way - a total nuclear exchange is way, way worse. Worst case if it loses hegemon status, Americans are losing at 1-2 decades of very shitty politics and economics.
No_one
3d ago
It's a profoundly uninteresting, predictable and depressing semitic squabble that doesn't involve continuous high-intensity ground combat between armies. In short, it's not actually a war.
No_one
3d ago
Lasers suffer from range issues in air to a great degree. Close to the ground power delivered falls with square of distance. So keeping the sky clear from 20 kilometers is really, really difficult even if you can track the target flawlessly and it'd be extremely costly even now. Not realistic.
I've heard both sides are reporting some success with some adapted laser welding units against FPVs, which aren't exactly sturdy and at 200m it might work. These units are now cheap ~$5000, but require a power supply.
No_one
3d ago
Translated article from Marianne on Macron's troop proposal: https://archive.is/u1j76#selection-3005.0-3323.65
By refusing to rule out sending troops to Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron has triggered an uproar across Europe and earned a rebuke from the United States. Several French officers, speaking to Marianne on condition of anonymity, say they were “knocked sideways.” “Let’s not kid ourselves: against the Russians we’re a cheer-leading squad!” scoffs a senior officer, convinced that dispatching French troops to the Ukrainian front would simply be “unreasonable.” At the Élysée, the stance is unapologetic: “The President wanted to send a strong signal,” says an adviser, describing the wording as “carefully measured and calibrated.”
At the Ministry for the Armed Forces, those close to Sébastien Lecornu defend the president’s wording: “The state of Ukrainian forces is deeply worrying. The president’s remarks are meant to jolt everyone and show we’re at a turning point.” How did we get here? Several classified defence reports, seen by Marianne, speak of a “critical situation.” Here are the three key findings—far removed from official talking-points.
Finding 1: A Ukrainian military victory is now impossible.
For months European chancelleries clung to the hope that Kyiv’s 2023 spring counter-offensive, backed by Western kit, would push the Russian army all the way back to Moscow. After-action reviews written this autumn are damning. “It gradually bogged down in mud and blood and achieved no strategic gains,” states one confidential defence report on the “failure of the Ukrainian offensive.”
The planning—drawn up in Kyiv and Western headquarters—proved “disastrous.” “Planners assumed that once the first Russian defensive belts were breached the whole front would collapse … These crucial preliminary phases ignored the enemy’s moral strength on the defensive: that is, the Russian soldier’s determination to cling to the ground,” the report notes, calling Western planning a “bankruptcy.” Another lesson is the poor training of Ukrainian soldiers and NCOs: “Newly formed brigades existed mostly on paper” and training never lasted more than three weeks. Lacking cadres and a critical mass of veterans, these “Year-Two soldiers” were thrown against a Russian fortification line that turned out to be impregnable. With no air support, a mish-mash of Western kit inferior to old Soviet gear (“obsolete, easy to maintain, usable in degraded mode,” says the report), Ukrainian troops had no chance of breaking through.
Add to that “Russia’s overwhelming dominance in electronic warfare, crippling Ukrainian drone use and command systems.” Today, “the Russian army is the tactical and technical benchmark for conceiving and executing defensive operations,” the report concludes. Not only does Moscow have the heavy engineer kit to build defensive works—“almost completely absent on the Ukrainian side, and impossible for the West to supply quickly”—but the 1,200-km front, known as the Surovikin Line, is mined on a colossal scale (7,000 km of mines). Another observation: “The Russians have also managed their reserve force to ensure operational endurance.” According to the document, Moscow reinforces units before they are exhausted, mixes recruits with seasoned troops, gives regular rear-area rest periods—and “has always maintained a coherent force pool to handle the unexpected.” Far from the Western cliché of a Russian army mindlessly feeding men into the meat-grinder… “To date, the Ukrainian general staff lacks a critical mass of ground forces capable of combined-arms manoeuvre at corps level able to challenge their Russian counterparts and break the defensive line,” the classified report concludes, warning that “the gravest analytical and judgement error would be to keep looking for exclusively military solutions to end the fighting.” A French senior officer sums up: “Looking at the forces on the ground, it’s clear Ukraine cannot win this war militarily.”
Finding 2: Kyiv has been forced onto the defensive.
The conflict entered a critical phase in December. According to our military sources in Paris, the Ukrainian army has been compelled to go on the defensive. “The combat motivation of Ukrainian soldiers is deeply affected,” notes a 2024 outlook report. “Zelensky needs 35,000 men a month; he is not recruiting half that, while Putin can draw on 30,000 volunteers each month,” says an officer just back from Kyiv. The balance of materiel is just as lopsided: the failed 2023 offensive “tactically destroyed” half of Kyiv’s 12 combat brigades. Western aid has never been lower. It is therefore clear no Ukrainian offensive can be mounted this year. “The West can ship 3-D printers to make drones or loitering munitions, but it can’t print soldiers,” the report notes. “Given the situation, the idea has been floated to reinforce the Ukrainian army not with fighters but with support troops in the rear, freeing Ukrainian soldiers for the front,” admits a senior officer, confirming a “quiet build-up” of Western troops in civilian clothes. Even if two American rail-cars—likely used by the CIA—are attached to the daily train from Poland to Kyiv, the West only half-admits the presence of special forces in Ukraine. “Besides the Americans, who let the New York Times visit a CIA camp, there are plenty of Brits,” says a military source, who does not deny the presence of French special forces— notably combat swimmers on training missions…
Finding 3: The risk of a Russian breakthrough is real.
This is the latest lesson from the Ukrainian front that gives French observers cold sweats. On 17 February Kyiv had to abandon the city of Avdiivka, north of Donetsk, until then a fortified bastion. “It was both the heart and the symbol of Ukrainian resistance in Russian-speaking Donbas,” notes a report on the “Battle of Avdiivka,” drawing a series of damning lessons. “The Russians changed their modus operandi, compartmentalising the city and, above all, using glide bombs on a large scale for the first time,” the document states. Whereas a 155 mm artillery shell carries 7 kg of explosive, a glide bomb delivers 200–700 kg and can pierce more than 2 m of reinforced concrete—hell for Ukrainian defences, which reportedly lost over 1,000 men a day. Moreover, the Russians now fit small-arms suppressors to foil acoustic detection on the battlefield. “The decision to withdraw Ukrainian forces came as a surprise,” the report notes, highlighting “its suddenness and lack of preparation,” raising fears it was “imposed on, rather than decided by, the Ukrainian command,” hinting at the start of a rout. “The Ukrainian armed forces have just shown tactically that they lack the human and material capacity… to hold a sector of the front under sustained enemy pressure,” the document continues. “The Ukrainian failure at Avdiivka shows that, despite the emergency dispatch of an ‘elite’ brigade—the 3rd Air Assault Azov Brigade—Kyiv is unable to shore up a collapsing sector locally,” the report warns. The art of “Maskovkira” What will the Russians do with this tactical success? Continue the current pattern of “nibbling and slow erosion” along the whole front, or push for a deep breakthrough? “The terrain behind Avdiivka allows it,” the recent document notes, adding that Western sources tend to “underestimate” the Russians, masters of “Maskovkira”—the practice of “appearing weak when you are strong.” According to this analysis, after two years of war Russian forces have demonstrated the ability to “develop operational endurance” enabling them to wage “a long, slow, high-intensity war based on the continuous attrition of the Ukrainian army.” A sobering conclusion for what comes next. Is this new strategic landscape—where the Russian army seems dominant and the Ukrainian army exhausted—what prompted Emmanuel Macron, “dynamically” as he put it, to consider sending troops? A realistic perspective given the current operational situation, described as “critical” by observers on the ground. “But what may look realistic from a strictly tactical standpoint can prove unrealistic from a strategic and diplomatic one,” sighs a French senior officer.
No_one
3d ago
Pretty sure they're using GLONASS, the Russian version of GPS.
Modern chips use every single satellite out there to calculate position. They probably use something similar, possibly improved to be jamming resistant.
If Russia can quickly make lots of cheap jet drones, so can Europe. Anything Russia can do, Europe can replicate.
Europe can't even supply the simplest, WW1 piece of technology Ukraine needs: artillery ammunition. We are on year 3.5 of an artillery war. Despite having what, 50x the GDP, Ukraine could theoretically get less than half of what Russia makes.
Only if there's a political failure, if the whole edifice just implodes as the Turks nope out, the Serbs and Hungarians decide it's not their war, if Britain and France won't really use nukes to defend Polish or German territory..
The French army allegedly told Macron to go hang after he floated the idea of sending them into Ukraine, just as 'peacekeepers'. You know, not 'on the front' just station them around key strategic areas where they'd be getting shot at with Russian missiles. (I'll include the translated article in a reply)
They'll be hemmed in at sea. They'll still be facing vast reserves of wealth and manpower, a foe with time on his side and talent to spare
Talent? Firstly, Russians would say they don't care about Germany/Poland, and they aren't South-Africa tier idiots who would say "just not yet". And maybe they'd be even correct, what Russians really care about is Americans out and being able to deal with Europe on a country basis. Even if conquest were possible (theoretically) it'd not be worth it - mass mobilization isn't what Russian citizens want, China wouldn't want it either.
As to ...what talent? NATO, the organisation, basically exists as sinecures for officers. European armies are small and have zero experience with modern warfare and not much critical equipment. No vast reserves of artillery. Shortages of air-defense missiles. Drone components would have to come from China, too.
Nick, 30 ans is not willing to let himself be conscripted by the million by governments he know doesn't care about him one iota and sent to the eastern front. Do you think all the young 'citizens' of immigrant origins who don't care about Europe one bit would let themselves be conscripted by the million, without starting to chimp?
Also, under ideal conditions- no pesky politicking, no sabotage by the courts, no foreign interference and vast reserves of veterans officers, it still took Germany what, 8 years to return from a small professional force to a large conscript army.
I don't buy that they'd risk a war with NATO unless China suplexes the US in Asia, at which point we all have much bigger concerns.
Not sure they'd want to take the Baltics, but I'd not rule it out either. They really hate them, Balt elites hate them back and are very keen on anti-Russian agitation, militarily it's doable and hey, it's not like the younger population of Baltics wouldn't just emigrate.
US Navy isn't ready to fight a missile-heavy war against China, near Chinese coasts. Aircraft carriers are of little help there. It'd need a lot more missile platforms and a lot more missiles. Both are in short supply.
Flak can shoot them down and acoustic or optical targeting is sufficient.
It flies at 3.500 meters. Flak at 35mm barely gets up there. Horizontal range to engage Gerans at cruise altitude with 35mm is maybe 1 km.
They're planning out routes all across Ukraine. It's much faster than a car. There's no way to realistically counter them from the ground unless you have massive amounts of accurate flak. Germany theoretically has 400 Gepard flak vehicles. Yeah, had they started upgrading them with modern electronics (I think it was 1970s equipment) back in '22, around now Ukraine would be able to create a 'barrier' 500 km long against Gerans. Or maybe 800, if we assume 2 kilometers horizontal range. They didn't - the 400 of so obsolete Gepards are sitting somewhere, waiting to be scrapped.
You can defend point targets if you put multiple flak systems on them. (and nobody tries something funny like having 20 dive at once etc.
By now, most everyone has forgotten about the war. It's still going on now, still killing probably 200-300 men a day, every day. Neither party wants to end it so, it's expected -by war nerds who follow it in detail- to go on until 2027..
Not that much has changed, it's still largely a war of attrition, though most killing is now done by FPV drone and artillery is now less than half of casualties. (at least for Russians it's true. Last I checked, <5% were by small arms).
There's a few new things, but one development itself is noteworthy. Both for what it says about the West, and for the prospects for the West.
Geran-2 (Shahed-136, 'Dorito') is an originally Iranian drone, a very cheap $50k marginal cost two-stroke piston engine powered kamikaze drone(or a particularly shitty cruise missile).
Russians have modified it and are now producing it wholly indigenously, except for the engines that are imported from China.
As you can see in this video, in which an infantry ammunition dump, probably near the front, gets hit by one.
Russia is now producing and using up to 200 a day, with Zelensky saying it might go up to 500 a day. Why is this a big problem? It's been upgraded to fly high, so you can't take them down with machineguns, but need guided munitions of really big flak guns - 35mm, 40mm, 57mm- or use planes. When they flew at a low altitude, Ukraine used to shoot them down with .50 machineguns from trucks.
Now it's diving on targets from 3km, so unless there's a very brave gunner on the spot, a .50 won't help you. There are variants with a datalink that can have a target assigned while they're flying. Here's Ukrainians talking about a drone that has been 'circling the town for 90 minutes'. (endurance is 5 hours).
Despite Russians having telegraphed this move (increased production) since the very start, West doesn't seem to have prepared in the slightest. There's no new cheap missile to take them down, nobody is building cheap pulsejet drones that can catch up & blow them up. Nobody was far-sighted enough to modify a 100 high-performance trainers with gun pods and fire control to allow shooting these down. Even the thoroughly obsolete A-10 Warthogs would serve great as drone interceptors, hundreds of kilometers from the front, finally putting that cannon in use somewhere. Even though right now they depend on GPS systems for accuracy, no one's figured out a way to jam them either. I thought the West was supposed to be innovative? Russia engages in a series of dead simple moves, doesn't even keep it secret, and the West does.. nothing?
Ukraine kept shooting expensive, high-performance missiles like Piorun or Stinger ($300k) at these till it ran out. Total production of Piorun missile is only 1000 a year, Stingers.. are in very limited production. So.. what now?
As total Russian cruise/ballistic missile production of all types is only 20 a day (contrast with the 80 a year Tomahawk production), an additional 200 strikes with 90 kg of HE to a range of 1000 km matter quite a lot. Between informers, long-range recon drones and so on, this could make front-line logistics situation of Ukraine even worse and even complicate frontline drone supply, as with 200 a day, drone workshops that get snitched on can get bombed. And while a 90 kilogram bomb is pretty bad, it's not going to take down an entire block of buildings like the half-ton cruise missiles, so even workshops in apartments blocks could end up on the target list.
The prospects are ..bad . We know from WW2 that jet engines can be cheaper to produce than piston engines. In the eventuality that Chinese develop a copy of a cheap drone jet engine (2 kN should push it to ~600 kph), one that currently sells for $70k, or make something like this at a lower cost, Russians could end up having a huge stocks of fairly cheap and capable cruise missiles. Unless Europeans wake up and develop an affordable counter- that'd be enough to deter European response to a Baltic occupations, as the drones themselves would exhaust stocks of European air-air missiles in a week and the air war would be unwinnable as dismantling Russian air defences would take far longer than it'd take for Russia to blow up all military objects within 800 km of the border.
No_one
4d ago
Why then has Russia not made significant territorial gains in so long? I don't understand why the Ukrainians haven't collapsed already if it's so lopsided against them, even when they have a defender's advantage tactically.
It's not to their advantage to take land that's going to require serious policing for a decade and will be full of terrorists / freedom fighters. Taking those big cities they need to take (Dnipro, Kharkiv) requires completely non-functional enemy armed forces. What better way to make the armed forces non-functional than to destroy them utterly ? If they go slowly, nationalistic, actually brave Ukrainians will feed themselves to the grinder till there's no one left. A sudden collapse caused by a major offensive would result in far more troublesome people later.
Also, more importantly, right now, numerically the forces are at about parity. If Russia wanted a big arrow offensive, it'd have to mobilize a lot of additional people, empty the rest of Russia of reserve formations. This isn't politically optimal. Russians mostly don't care about the war that much, and though there are enough volunteers, if they wanted another half a million troops, there'd be a shortage of equipment too.
Your allegation is that ISW is making it up? How does all this square with identifiable vehicle losses?
'identifiable vehicle losses' can be gamed if your criteria are loose enough. ISW are not serious people.
What is "deteriorating fast" here?
At the very least, air defense situation. They're not even pretending they're shooting down all the Gerans like they used to. Since there's not enough good enough point defenses, everything vaguely army related is blowing up all over Ukraine.
Funny, that's how I feel about an establishment that employs Trita Parsi at all, let alone as management.
The guy who wrote it served as a combat arms officer for a few decades. It wasn't written by Parsi.
How many more months need to go on before you think the CSIS analysis is more correct than "Responsible Statecraft's" about the present state of affairs?
Go read their older reports. These people are not total idiots - they carefully avoid making predictions. Here's a '23 report from them. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition
It's slop. Says 'Ukraine keeps fighting because it innovates' (more ISR through drones) but Russians did all the same things. 'Human wave attacks'. I don't think there was even one, and non-journalist westerners who were actually there there call bullshit on that too.. Mind you, same volunteer here directly contradicts CSIS because he says he believes Russians have better ISR and use their drones more. (but yawn, what does he know? He's just a dumb military animal)
Quoting that 'report'
Information Operations: Ukraine has utilized UASs for information operations, such as showing successful strikes and placing them—overtly or covertly—on social media platforms such as Twitter, Telegram, and TikTok.
Oh yeah, that's something what Russians only figured out in 2025.(facepalm)
Russians wouldn't settle for 'freezing the conflict', they're not idiots. They're going to demand neutrality or keep fighting.
They have said that over and over.
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